Case Note & Summary
The Supreme Court of India considered whether a procedural amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which allowed an accused person to testify as a witness in his own defence, applied to a criminal trial that was already pending when the amendment came into force. The appellant, Anant Gopal Sheorey, was accused in a complaint filed on January 13, 1953, by the Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh under Section 282 of the Indian Companies Act and Sections 465 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code. The proceedings commenced in 1954 before a Magistrate, but were transferred on May 18, 1955, to a Special Magistrate, who began recording evidence on July 4, 1955. During the trial, the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act 26 of 1955) received the President's assent on August 12, 1955, and came into force on January 2, 1956. The amendment inserted Section 342A into the Code, providing that any person accused of an offence before a criminal court shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges, subject to the condition that he shall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing, and his failure to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment or give rise to any presumption against him. The appellant applied on January 14, 1956, to the Special Magistrate to be allowed to appear as a witness under Section 342A. The Magistrate dismissed the application, and the High Court of Nagpur confirmed that decision, holding that the language of Section 116 of the amending Act, particularly clause (c) with the phrase 'as if this Act had not been passed', meant that pending proceedings should continue under the unamended Code and the accused could not testify. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. The primary legal issue was whether Section 342A applied to pending prosecutions where the recording of evidence had commenced before the amendment. The appellant argued that on a plain construction of Section 116, only certain specified provisions were excluded from pending proceedings, and Section 342A was not among them, so it applied retrospectively. The respondent contended that the words 'as if this Act had not been passed' in clause (c) excluded all provisions of the amending Act from pending trials, making Section 342A inapplicable. The Court reasoned that under general law, a change in procedure operates retrospectively, and no person has a vested right in any course of procedure. Section 116 of the amending Act contained specific exclusions for certain provisions in clauses (a) to (d), followed by a general clause that 'save as aforesaid, the provisions of this Act and the amendments made thereby shall apply to all proceedings instituted after the commencement of this Act and also to all proceedings pending in any Criminal Court on the date of such commencement.' The Court held that the phrase 'as if this Act had not been passed' in clause (c) must be read narrowly to refer only to the particular sections listed in that clause (sections 4(w), 207A, 251A, and 260), and not to the entire amending Act, otherwise it would conflict with the concluding portion of Section 116. The Court noted that Section 342A is in Chapter 24 of the Code and nothing in the amending Act made it inapplicable to pending proceedings. The Court also observed that before the amendment, an accused could not appear as a witness because of Section 342 of the unamended Code, and Section 118 of the Evidence Act was inapplicable to such persons. The insertion of Section 342A, consistent with Article 20(3) of the Constitution, made the accused a competent but not compellable witness. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the High Court and Special Magistrate, and held that the appellant's application to appear as a witness was well-founded and should be allowed. The decision established that procedural amendments apply retrospectively to pending cases unless expressly excluded, and clarified the interpretation of the saving clause in the amending Act.
Headnote
A) Criminal Procedure - Retrospective Operation of Procedural Law - Section 342A Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and Section 116 Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955 - Procedural changes apply to pending proceedings unless expressly excluded - The accused in a pending trial sought to testify as a defence witness under newly inserted Section 342A; the Magistrate and High Court rejected, holding unamended procedure applied. The Supreme Court held that no person has a vested right in procedure and Section 116's saving clause only excludes specific provisions, not Section 342A, so the amendment applies retrospectively. Held that the accused is a competent witness and the application should be allowed. (Paras Not mentioned) B) Statutory Interpretation - Construction of Saving Clause - Section 116 Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955 - Scope of words 'as if this Act had not been passed' - The phrase in clause (c) must be read narrowly to refer only to the enumerated sections (4(w), 207A, 251A, 260) and not to the entire amending Act, to avoid conflict with the concluding portion of Section 116 which applies the amended Code to all pending proceedings. Held that Section 342A is not excluded. (Paras Not mentioned) C) Constitutional Law - Privilege against Self-Incrimination - Article 20(3) Constitution of India and Section 342A Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 - Accused as competent defence witness cannot be compelled - The Court recognized that Section 342A permits the accused to testify voluntarily, with no compulsion and no adverse inference from failure to testify, balancing the constitutional protection against self-incrimination. Held that the accused's choice to testify is protected. (Paras Not mentioned) D) Evidence - Competency of Accused as Witness - Section 118 Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 - Prior law disqualified accused; amendment changed rule - Under the unamended Code, an accused person could not appear as a witness, making Section 118 inapplicable. The insertion of Section 342A overrode that bar, making the accused a competent witness for the defence. Held that the appellant was entitled to give evidence on oath in disproof of charges. (Paras Not mentioned)
Issue of Consideration
Whether Section 342A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, inserted by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955, applies to a pending prosecution where recording of evidence commenced before the amendment; and whether the saving clause in Section 116 of the amending Act excludes the application of the amended provision to such pending proceedings.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the High Court and Special Magistrate, and held that the appellant's application to appear as a witness under Section 342A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was well-founded and should be allowed. The Court declared that the amended procedural provision applied to pending proceedings, making the accused a competent witness for the defence.
Law Points
- Legal points not extracted
- change in procedure operates retrospectively
- no vested right in course of procedure
- Section 342A CrPC makes accused competent witness for defence
- Section 116 of amending act expressly saves only specified provisions
- saving clause must be construed to avoid conflict
