Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose from a general election to the Municipal Board of Bareilly held in October 1953. The appellant, Mangoo Singh, was one of several candidates from Ward No. 15, along with respondent No. 3, Imdad Husain. Both filed nominations on October 5, 1953; scrutiny took place on October 7, 1953. Imdad Husain objected to the appellant's nomination on the ground that the appellant was disqualified under clause (g) of Section 13-D of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, because he was in arrears of municipal tax in excess of one year's demand. The objection was dismissed by the Assistant Returning Officer, and the appellant's nomination was accepted. The poll was held on October 26, 1953, and the appellant was declared elected as one of four returned candidates from the ward; Imdad Husain was fifth and became the top unsuccessful candidate. Imdad Husain filed an election petition before the Election Tribunal challenging the appellant's election. The Tribunal, by judgment dated October 20, 1954, held that the appellant was in arrears of municipal tax in excess of one year's demand to which Section 166 of the Act applied, and thus came under the disqualification in Section 13-D(g). It further held that the payment of Rs. 115-3-0 on October 10, 1953, five days after the nomination date, did not wipe off the disqualification and the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to Section 13-D. The Tribunal also noted that no bill for payment was presented under Section 166 and no demand notice was served under Section 168, but still found disqualification. Accordingly, it set aside the appellant's election and declared a casual vacancy under Section 25(2)(a). The appellant challenged this decision by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Allahabad High Court. A single judge dismissed the petition, and a Division Bench dismissed the special appeal on August 30, 1955. The High Court granted a certificate of fitness under Article 133(1)(c) on February 3, 1956, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The primary legal issues before the Supreme Court were: whether the relevant date for the operation of disqualification under Section 13-D(g) is the date of filing nomination or the date of poll; whether payment of arrears after nomination but before poll retroactively removes the disqualification; and the correct interpretation of the expressions "to which section 166 applies" and "demand" in that clause. The appellant argued that "for being chosen as" referred to the date of poll, and since he had paid the arrears before the poll, he was not disqualified on that date. He also contended that the second proviso made the disqualification transient, ceasing upon payment, and that no bill under Section 166 or demand notice under Section 168 had been served, so he was not in arrears of a "demand" to which Section 166 applied. The respondent countered that disqualification attached at any stage of the election process, including nomination, and subsequent payment could not cure it retrospectively. The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contentions. Relying on earlier decisions such as Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram and Others, N.P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, and Harford v. Linskey, the Court held that the process of "being chosen" consists of a series of steps starting with nomination and ending with announcement of the election. Therefore, if a disqualification attaches at the nomination stage, the person cannot be chosen, regardless of later payment. The Court further held that the wiping off of disqualification under the second proviso has no retrospective effect; the disqualification that subsisted on the day of filing nominations did not cease to subsist on that day by reason of subsequent payment. Regarding the interpretation of the clause, the Court ruled that the phrase "to which section 166 applies" merely describes the nature or type of dues and does not require procedural compliance with Section 166. The word "demand" means "claim" or "due" and does not attract the operation of Section 168. Consequently, the absence of a bill or demand notice did not remove the disqualification. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court and the Election Tribunal, and confirmed that the appellant's election was rightly set aside.
Headnote
A) Election Law - Disqualification for Membership - "For being chosen as" - U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, Section 13-D(g) - The expression "for being chosen as" encompasses the entire election process from nomination to declaration of result. A person disqualified on date of filing nomination cannot be chosen because the disqualification attaches at that stage. The court relied on Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram, N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, and Harford v. Linskey. Held that nomination is an integral part of election; disqualification on nomination date bars candidacy even if paid before poll. (Paras 5-8) B) Election Law - Effect of Proviso - Cessation of Disqualification on Payment - U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, Section 13-D second proviso - The proviso states disqualification shall cease as soon as arrears are paid, but this cessation has no retrospective effect. Payment after nomination does not wipe out disqualification that existed on nomination day. Held that the disqualification subsisting on nomination date continues to bar candidacy despite subsequent payment before poll. (Paras 9-11) C) Statutory Interpretation - Meaning of "to which section 166 applies" - U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, Sections 13-D(g), 166 - The phrase "to which section 166 applies" describes the nature or type of dues, not the procedural requirements of presenting a bill. It refers to arrears of municipal tax or other dues of the kind covered by Section 166, without requiring compliance with Section 166's billing procedure. Held that the absence of presentation of bill under Section 166 does not exclude dues from the scope of Section 13-D(g). (Paras 12-13) D) Statutory Interpretation - Meaning of "Demand" - U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, Sections 13-D(g), 168 - The word "demand" in Section 13-D(g) means "claim" or "due" and refers to the amount of arrears, not to a formal notice of demand under Section 168. Held that failure to serve demand notice under Section 168 does not negate disqualification; "demand" is used in the sense of a sum due. (Paras 14-15)
Issue of Consideration
The true scope, meaning and effect of clause (g) of Section 13-D of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, including the relevant date for disqualification, effect of payment before poll, and interpretation of 'demand' and 'to which section 166 applies'.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the judgments of the Allahabad High Court and the Election Tribunal, and held that the appellant was disqualified under Section 13-D(g) of U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 on the date of nomination and subsequent payment of arrears did not remove the disqualification retrospectively. The election of appellant was rightly set aside.
Law Points
- Legal points not extracted
- A person disqualified on date of nomination cannot be chosen as member
- disqualification under Section 13-D(g) attaches from nomination date
- subsequent payment of arrears has no retrospective effect
- 'for being chosen as' includes entire election process
- 'to which section 166 applies' describes nature of dues
- 'demand' means claim or due not requiring notice under Section 168
