Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose from a notice issued by the Income-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle, Ahmedabad, under Section 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, to M/s Navanagar Transport & Industries Ltd., a company in which the public were not substantially interested. For the assessment year 1957-58, the company had declared a dividend of Rs. 8,767 at the annual general meeting held on December 4, 1957, for the year ending March 31, 1957. The Income-tax Officer determined the company's taxable income at Rs. 1,10,769. Since the dividend was less than the statutory percentage of total income as reduced by taxes, on November 15, 1961, the Income-tax Officer issued a show cause notice under Section 23A and sought permission from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (8). The assessee company then filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Gujarat, seeking a writ of mandamus restraining the Income-tax Officer from giving effect to the notice. The High Court held that after the amendment of Section 23A by the Finance Act, 1955, an order under that section was an order of assessment to which the limitation period under Section 34(3) applied. Consequently, since the four-year period from the end of assessment year 1957-58 expired on March 31, 1962, the proceedings initiated after that date were without jurisdiction. The Income-tax Officer appealed to the Supreme Court with a certificate granted by the High Court. The core legal issue was whether an order under Section 23A was an order of assessment for the purpose of limitation under Section 34(3), and whether Section 23A was a charging section. The appellant contended that Section 23A was not a charging section and the order under it was not an assessment order, hence limitation did not apply. The respondent contended that after the 1955 amendment, Section 23A imposed direct tax liability on the company and the order was therefore an assessment order to which Section 34(3) limitation applied. The Supreme Court traced the history of Section 23A. Before the 1955 amendment, the provision was procedural and required two steps: an order deeming undistributed income to be distributed among shareholders, followed by individual shareholder assessments. The 1955 amendment replaced this two-step procedure with a direct liability on the company to pay super-tax at four annas in the rupee on the undistributed balance. The Court held that despite this change, Section 23A was not a charging section; the charge to tax arose under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act. Section 23A only provided machinery for imposing additional super-tax. The Court emphasized that not every order which contemplates computation of income for determining tax payable is an order of assessment, and prescribing procedure for determining and imposing tax liability does not make an order an assessment. Therefore, the period of limitation under Section 34(3) applied only to orders of assessment, not to every order directing payment of tax. The Court referred to Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City-I v. Robert J. Sas and Others. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and held that the notice under Section 23A for assessment year 1957-58 was not time-barred and the proceedings were not without jurisdiction.
Headnote
A) Income Tax - Interpretation of Assessment - Order under Section 23A not an order of assessment - Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, Sections 23A, 34(3) - Income-tax Officer issued a show cause notice under Section 23A for assessment year 1957-58; High Court held the prospective order was an order of assessment and time-barred under Section 34(3). Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 23A is not a charging section and an order under it is not an order of assessment, so limitation under Section 34(3) does not apply. Held that proceedings were not without jurisdiction (Pages 1-11). B) Income Tax - Charging Section - Charge under Sections 3, 4 and 5, not under Section 23A - Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, Sections 3, 4, 5, 23A - Section 23A, after its amendment by Finance Act, 1955, imposed direct liability on the company for additional super-tax on undistributed income, but it remained a machinery provision, not a charging section. The charge to tax arises under the general charging sections. Held that Section 23A is not a charging section (Pages 1-11). C) Income Tax - Scope of Assessment Order - Not every order directing payment of tax is an order of assessment - Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, Section 34(3) - Prescribing procedure for determining and imposing tax liability does not convert an order into an order of assessment. The period of limitation under Section 34(3) applies only to orders of assessment, not to every order directing payment of tax. Held that Section 34(3) limitation does not govern Section 23A orders (Pages 1-11).
Issue of Consideration
Whether an order under Section 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, after its amendment by Finance Act, 1955, is an 'order of assessment' to which the period of limitation prescribed by Section 34(3) applies; whether Section 23A is a charging section.
Final Decision
Appeal allowed; the judgment and order of the Gujarat High Court dated February 21, 1964 in Special Civil Application No. 802 of 1962 was set aside. The Supreme Court held that Section 23A is not a charging section and an order made under it is not an 'order of assessment' to which the period of limitation prescribed by Section 34(3) applies; consequently, the notice under Section 23A for assessment year 1957-58 was not time-barred and the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to proceed.
Law Points
- Section 23A is not a charging section
- order under Section 23A is not an order of assessment
- limitation under Section 34(3) does not apply to Section 23A orders
- charge to tax arises under Sections 3 4 and 5
- not every order computing income is an order of assessment
- Section 23A provides machinery for imposition of additional super-tax on undistributed income



