Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose from a partition suit filed by Mst. Bhagwano Kunwar, widow of Ramyad Singh, who claimed an eight annas share in joint family properties governed by Mitakshara Hindu law. Ramyad Singh died issueless, and the central factual controversy was whether he died in 1936, before the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 came into force, or in 1939, after its enactment. If he died in 1936, the widow was entitled only to maintenance; if he died in 1939, she was entitled to a share in the joint estate and could maintain the suit for partition. The trial court decreed the suit in her favour, accepting that Ramyad Singh died in 1939. The defendants, Janki Singh and Kailashpati Singh among others, appealed to the Patna High Court, which reversed the decree and dismissed the suit, holding that the widow could not rely on an admission in a plaint filed by them in an earlier Title Suit No. 3 of 1948, because she did not accept all statements in that plaint and because an admission in a pleading could be used only for the suit in which it was filed. During the pendency of the High Court appeals, Bhagwano Kunwar died on December 15, 1958. She had earlier sold lands measuring 1 bigha 5 kathas to Basant Singh by a deed dated March 14, 1958. The High Court allowed Basant Singh's application for substitution under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Basant Singh then filed two civil appeals before the Supreme Court under certificates granted by the High Court. The main legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the admission contained in the plaint signed and verified by Janki Singh and Kailashpati Singh in the previous suit, stating that Ramyad Singh died in 1939, was admissible against them in the present suit under Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The High Court had reasoned that the plaintiff could not rely on that statement because she was not prepared to accept the correctness of the other statements in the plaint, particularly the statement that she had surrendered her life estate and was entitled to maintenance only. The High Court also observed that an admission in a pleading could be used only for the purposes of the suit in which the pleading was filed. The appellant argued that the entire plaint was tendered and admissible, and the court could accept some statements and reject the rest. The respondents contended that the admission should be excluded and sought to explain that the plaint was drafted by their lawyer without their understanding. The Supreme Court, speaking through Bachawat J., held that the High Court's reasoning was incorrect. All statements in the plaint were admissible as evidence once the entire plaint was tendered and no objection was raised to admissibility. The court was not bound to accept all statements as correct; it could accept some and reject the rest. The statement that the widow had surrendered her estate was rejected because it was common case that no surrender had occurred, but the statement regarding the date of death was a clear admission against the defendants. The Court further held that under Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there is no distinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions. An admission in a plaint signed and verified by a party may be used as evidence against him in other suits, though it is not conclusive and the party may show that it is not true. The Court distinguished English law, noting that even there a pleading signed or adopted by a party is admissible. The explanation that the defendants signed the plaint without understanding its contents was rejected on evidence that the plaint was drafted at Janki Singh's instance, read over to him, and verified as true. The admission was regarded as strong evidence of the date of death. Corroborating oral evidence from the widow's witnesses and rent receipts supported the finding that Ramyad Singh died in 1939. The defendants' evidence that he died in 1936 was disbelieved, and their conduct in obtaining a compromise decree by fraud further undermined their credibility. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's dismissal, and restored the trial court's decree in favour of the plaintiff's successor-in-interest, subject to modification. Since Bhagwano Kunwar had died and Basant Singh had purchased 1 bigha 5 kathas of land from her, the decree of the trial court was modified to reflect the appellant's limited interest. The Court held that Ramyad Singh died in 1939, the widow was entitled to an eight annas share in the joint estate, and after 1956 she held that share as full owner under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Headnote
A) Evidence - Admissions - Section 17 Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Admissibility of admission in prior plaint - An admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him in a prior suit is admissible as evidence against him in other litigations; it is not conclusive and the party may show that it is not true - The High Court erroneously held that such an admission could be used only for the suit in which the pleading was filed; the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes no distinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions, and it may be proved against the party in other suits (Paras 3-4). B) Evidence - Admissions - Use of plaint as admission - Court not bound to accept all statements as correct - A party tendering an entire plaint may rely on a particular statement as an admission without accepting the correctness of the other statements; the court may accept some statements and reject the rest - The widow relied on the statement in the prior plaint that her husband died in 1939, while rejecting the statement that she had surrendered her estate and was entitled to maintenance only; the Supreme Court held that the entire plaint was admissible, but only the date of death statement was accepted as true because it was common case that no surrender had occurred (Para 3). C) Hindu Law - Women's Rights to Property - Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 and Bihar Hindu Women's Rights to Property (Extension to Agricultural Land) Act, 1942 - Widow's right to partition depends on husband dying after commencement of the Act - If the husband died in 1936 before the Act, the widow was entitled to maintenance only; if he died in 1939 after the Act, she was entitled to an eight annas share and could sue for partition - After 1956, the widow held her share as full owner by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; on the strength of a sale deed dated March 14, 1958 executed by the widow, the purchaser was entitled to continue the partition suit after her death (Paras 2, 5-6). D) Practice and Procedure - Substitution - Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Substitution of purchaser pendente lite - Where the original plaintiff died during pendency of appeal and had earlier sold part of the property to the appellant, the High Court correctly allowed the appellant's application for substitution under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as the right to sue had devolved on him - The Supreme Court upheld the substitution and directed modification of the trial court decree in light of the death of the original plaintiff and the appellant's purchase of 1 bigha 5 kathas of land (Paras 2, 6).
Issue of Consideration
Whether an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him in a previous suit is admissible as evidence against him in a subsequent suit under Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; whether the court is bound to accept all statements in the plaint as correct; and whether the widow was entitled to maintain a partition suit based on the date of death of her husband and claim an eight annas share under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court allowed both appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the trial court's decree in favour of the plaintiff's successor-in-interest. The Court held that the admission in the prior plaint that Ramyad Singh died in 1939 was admissible under Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and was strong evidence of the date of death. The explanation for the admission was rejected as false. The Court found on the evidence that Ramyad Singh died in 1939, and therefore Bhagwano Kunwar was entitled to an eight annas share in the joint family estate and could maintain the partition suit. However, in view of Bhagwano Kunwar's death during the appeal and the sale deed dated March 14, 1958 in favour of the appellant for 1 bigha 5 kathas of land, the decree of the trial court was modified to reflect the appellant's limited interest as purchaser of that land.
Law Points
- Legal points not extracted
- An admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him in a prior suit is admissible as evidence against him in other suits under Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act
- 1872
- such admission is not conclusive and may be rebutted
- the court is not bound to accept all statements in a plaint as correct and may accept some and reject the rest
- a party tendering a plaint may rely on a particular admission without admitting the correctness of other statements
- Section 17 makes no distinction between admissions in pleadings and other admissions
- a widow's right to partition under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act
- 1937 depends on whether her husband died after the commencement of that Act
- after 1956 a Hindu widow holds her share as full owner under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act
- 1956
- a transferee pendente lite may be substituted under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
- 1908
