Case Note & Summary
This case involved a dispute over arrears of rent for a brick kiln leased under a registered deed. The respondents were owners of a brick kiln situated on plots nos. 596 and 597 in Mauza Sarwat, Pargana and District Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh. They leased the brick kiln to the appellant by registered lease deed dated December 29, 1950, for a term from January 1, 1951 to September 30, 1953, at a monthly rent of Rs. 41 payable annually in October. The appellant failed to pay rent for the period October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953. The respondents instituted Suit No. 1125 of 1953 in the Court of Munsif, Muzaffarnagar, claiming recovery of Rs. 492 as arrears of rent. The appellant contested, pleading that after the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 came into force, the plots of land had vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh under Section 6(a) with effect from July 1, 1952, and therefore the respondents had no right to claim rent. The trial court, by judgment dated February 12, 1955, held that the brick kiln did not vest in the State and, as it occupied only one-third of the total area, the respondents were entitled to one-third of the rent, granting a decree for Rs. 164. Both parties appealed. The Additional Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar, by common judgment dated August 19, 1957, held that the brick kiln was not a building within Section 9 of the Act and that the entire area of both plots had vested in the State, allowing the appellant's appeal and dismissing the suit. The respondents then filed Second Appeals No. 2510 and 2511 of 1957 before the Allahabad High Court, which, by judgment dated October 24, 1960, reversed the first appellate court, holding that the brick kiln was a building under Section 9 and that the respondents had acquired rights of statutory tenants with the right to demand rent. Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. The core question was whether the disputed brick kiln was a "building" within the meaning of Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, and consequently whether the land remained with the respondents or vested in the State. The appellant contended that the brick kiln had no site, was not a roofed structure, and was merely a pit with some bricks by its sides; hence it was not a building, and the land vested in the State, extinguishing any rent liability. The respondents argued that the brick kiln was a building, and under Section 9, the site with appurtenant area was deemed settled with them, giving them the status of statutory tenants and the right to claim rent. The Supreme Court noted that the Act did not define "building" and thus the word must be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense. After discussing Webster's dictionary definition and the observation of Blackburn J. in R. v. Neath Canal Navigation, the Court held that whether a structure is a building is a question of degree depending on facts. In the present case, the first appellate court had found that the brick kiln had no site, was not roofed, had no walls, and was a mere pit dug in the ground with bricks by its side. The Court concluded that such a brick kiln could not be regarded as a building under Section 9. Therefore, the plots, including the brick kiln, vested in the State with effect from July 1, 1952, and the respondents were not entitled to claim rent for the period after vesting. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals with costs, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the respondents' suit for arrears of rent.
Headnote
A) Property Law - Vesting of Estates - Sections 4, 6(a) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 - Upon notification under Section 4, all rights, title and interest of intermediaries in every estate including land, grove-land, forests, fisheries, tanks, ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways, abadi sites, hats, bazars and meals and sub-soil vested in State free from encumbrances from date of vesting, subject to exceptions like buildings under Section 9 (Paras Not mentioned). The court examined the statutory scheme where the State acquired intermediary interests, but buildings and their appurtenant sites continued to belong to the intermediary as statutory tenant. In the present case, since the brick kiln was not a building, the entire plots vested in the State, extinguishing the respondents' right to claim rent for the post-vesting period. Held that the title to both plots vested in State with effect from July 1, 1952, and the respondents were not entitled to any rent. B) Statutory Interpretation - Meaning of 'Building' - Section 9 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 - The word 'building' must be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense; whether a structure is a building is a question of degree depending on facts; a brick kiln with no walls, no roof, and merely a pit dug in ground with bricks by its side is not a building (Paras Not mentioned). The High Court erred in treating the brick kiln as a building; the Supreme Court held that the absence of walls and roof and the fact of a mere pit meant it could not be considered a building. Referred to R. v. Neath Canal Navigation (40 L.J.M.C. 197) where Blackburn J. observed masonry on the sides of a canal is not sufficient to constitute a building, while Holborn Viaduct would be a building. Held that the brick kiln leased to the appellant was not a building under Section 9, and therefore the land vested in the State.
Issue of Consideration
Whether a brick kiln on plots nos. 596 and 597, leased to the appellant, is a 'building' within the meaning of Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, and consequently whether the land vested in the State under Section 6(a) extinguishing the respondents' right to rent.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals with costs, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the respondents' suit for arrears of rent. The brick kiln was held not to be a 'building' under Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, and the title to both plots nos. 596 and 597 along with the brick kiln vested in the State with effect from July 1, 1952; the respondents were not entitled to claim any rent for the period from October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953.
Law Points
- Legal points not extracted
- The word 'building' in Section 9 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
- 1951
- not being defined
- must be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense
- whether a structure is a building is a question of degree depending on facts
- a brick kiln without walls or roof
- being a mere pit with bricks by its side
- is not a building
- upon notification under Section 4
- all rights
- title and interest of intermediaries in estates
- including land
- vest in the State free from encumbrances
- subject to exceptions like buildings under Section 9
- the site of wells
- trees in abadi and buildings continue to belong to the intermediary as statutory tenant
