Case Note & Summary
The litigation arose from an application by two workmen of the Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd., Akola, claiming compensation for lay-off from March 5, 1960 to October 22, 1960. The workmen filed the application before the Second Labour Court, Bombay under Section 33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking recovery of money due from the employer. The employer resisted the claim on two preliminary grounds: first, that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute should be tried under the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act, 1947; and second, that the application under Section 33C was incompetent because the amount payable for lay-off required calculation and was not a predetermined sum. The Second Labour Court rejected both objections. The employer then moved the Bombay High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, but the High Court dismissed the writ petition. The employer appealed to the Supreme Court by certificate. The core legal questions were whether the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or the C.P. and Berar Act governed lay-off compensation, and whether Section 33C(1) could be invoked when the amount had to be computed. The employer argued that the Central Act did not apply because Section 31 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 and Section 25J of the Industrial Disputes Act saved the operation of State laws, and that the C.P. and Berar Act applied to the textile industry. The employer further argued that the claim under Section 33C was not for 'money due' but required adjudication, making the application incompetent. The workmen contended that compensation for lay-off was provided only under Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and that Section 33C provided the remedy. The Supreme Court rejected the employer's contentions. It observed that Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, inserted by the 1953 Amendment, was the only chapter containing provisions for lay-off or compensation for lay-off. The C.P. and Berar Act contained no provision either for recovery of money or for compensation for lay-off. Therefore, a workman's claim for lay-off could only be decided under the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 25J(2) expressly declared that nothing in the Chapter would affect State laws providing for settlement of industrial disputes, but that rights and liabilities relating to lay-off and retrenchment would be determined in accordance with Chapter V-A. Thus, even if Sections 31 and 25J saved the State Act, they did so subject to the condition that lay-off claims be decided under Chapter V-A. Section 33C provided that a dispute for any money due under Chapter V-A had to go before the appropriate Government or its delegate, which in this case was the Second Labour Court, Bombay. On the second issue, the Court followed its recent decision in Kays Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors. and held that it was not essential for a claim under Section 33C(1) to be for a predetermined sum; calculation of the amount did not bar the application. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the Second Labour Court had jurisdiction and the application under Section 33C(1) was competent. It dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court's order.
Headnote
A) Labour Law - Lay-off Compensation - Jurisdiction - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sections 25C, 25J, 33C - Compensation for lay-off could only be determined under Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act, 1947 contained no provision for lay-off compensation. The court held that Section 25J(2) expressly required rights and liabilities relating to lay-off to be determined under Chapter V-A, and Section 33C provided the remedy. Held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction. (Paras Not mentioned) B) Labour Law - Recovery of Money Due - Section 33C(1), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Claim for lay-off compensation required calculation but was still a claim for money due. The court followed Kays Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors. and held that it was not essential for the claim to be for a predetermined sum. Held that the application under Section 33C(1) was competent. (Paras Not mentioned) C) Statutory Interpretation - Effect of State Laws - Sections 25J and 31, Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Acts - Section 31 of the 1956 Amendment Act could not oust the Central Act because Section 33C was expressly included to enable workmen to claim money due under Chapter V-A. The C.P. and Berar Act did not apply because it lacked provisions for lay-off compensation. Held that the attempt to apply the State Act failed. (Paras Not mentioned)
Issue of Consideration
(i) Whether the Second Labour Court had jurisdiction to decide a claim for lay-off compensation under Section 33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, notwithstanding the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act, 1947; (ii) Whether an application under Section 33C(1) was competent when the amount of compensation had to be calculated and was not a predetermined sum
Final Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Second Labour Court had jurisdiction under Section 33C(1) and that the claim for lay-off compensation was competent even though calculation was required. The C.P. & Berar Act did not oust the Central Act because it contained no provision for lay-off compensation.
Law Points
- Compensation for lay-off can only be determined under Chapter V-A of Industrial Disputes Act
- 1947
- Section 25J(2) makes Chapter V-A prevail over inconsistent State laws
- Section 33C(1) provides a remedy for workmen to recover money due under Chapter V-A
- claim under Section 33C need not be a predetermined sum
- C.P. and Berar Act has no provision for lay-off compensation
