Case Note & Summary
The appeal arose from a conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of four persons: the appellant's aunt Ratni, her daughter Chamin, her son-in-law Somra, and Somra's son Dilu. The appellant was tried by the Judicial Commissioner of Chotanagpur, convicted, and sentenced to death. The Patna High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence on a death reference and dismissed the appellant's criminal appeal. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. The principal evidence against him was a first information report lodged by the appellant himself at Palkot police station, which contained a full confession of the murders. The report narrated the motive, the sequence of killings, the concealment of bodies and weapon, and the appellant's intention to eliminate his aunt's family to inherit her property. The prosecution also relied on recoveries of dead bodies and a tangi made pursuant to information given by the appellant while in custody, and a bloodstained chadar recovered from his house. The trial court and High Court had admitted various portions of the FIR, treating only the direct statements of killing as barred by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The appellant contended that the entire FIR was a confession made to a police officer and thus wholly inadmissible. The respondent argued that only those portions disclosing the actual killings were protected. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, emphasizing that a confession made to a police officer is absolutely barred under Section 25, regardless of custody or investigation status. The Court held that a confession may consist of several parts and may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime but also motive, preparation, and opportunity; if the confession is tainted, the taint attaches to the entire statement. It rejected the argument that only parts directly admitting the offence are barred, stating that once a statement contains an admission of an offence, every other admission of an incriminating fact is part of the confession and equally inadmissible. The Court clarified that the fact of lodging the FIR is admissible as evidence of conduct under Section 8, and that Section 27 permits proof of information distinctly leading to discovery of facts, but no more. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court ruled that the appellant's FIR was a confessional statement to a police officer and no part of it could be admitted except to the extent permitted by Section 27 and the identification of the appellant as maker. Since the remaining evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence.
Headnote
A) Evidence Law - Confessions to Police Officers - Admissibility - Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 25 - Section 25 imposes an absolute bar on proving a confession made to a police officer against an accused, irrespective of whether the accused was in custody or whether investigation had begun. The court reasoned that such confessions are not to be trusted and the provision is based on public policy, so the fullest effect should be given to it. Held that if a confession contains an admission of an offence, the taint attaches to the whole statement including every other admission of an incriminating fact (Paras Not mentioned). B) Evidence Law - Confessional First Information Report - Admissibility and Exceptions - Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 25, 27, 8 - A first information report lodged by the accused himself containing a full confession is a confessional statement to a police officer and is inadmissible against him under Section 25. The fact of giving the information is admissible as evidence of conduct under Section 8, and so much of the information as relates distinctly to facts discovered under Section 27 is admissible, but the narrative confession and other incriminating admissions are barred. Held that no part of the FIR could be admitted except to the extent of Section 27 and identification of the appellant as maker (Paras Not mentioned). C) Evidence Law - Discovery Statement - Exception Under Section 27 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 27 - Section 27 is a proviso that partially lifts the ban imposed by Sections 24, 25 and 26, allowing proof of information that relates distinctly to facts discovered in consequence of information received from an accused in police custody. The court clarified that this section permits only the discovery-related portion and not the entire confession. Held that the appellant's statements leading to the discovery of dead bodies and tangi could be proved to that limited extent (Paras Not mentioned).
Issue of Consideration
Whether the entire confessional statement in the first information report made by the accused to a police officer is barred by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, or only those portions relating to the actual commission of the crime.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court held that the entire confessional first information report made to a police officer was inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, except to the limited extent permitted by Section 27 for discovered facts and the fact of lodging the report as evidence of conduct under Section 8. Since the remaining evidence was insufficient to convict, the conviction and sentence were set aside and the appellant was acquitted.
Law Points
- Confession made to a police officer is absolutely barred under Section 25 of Indian Evidence Act
- 1872
- The taint of confession attaches to the whole statement including admissions of incriminating facts
- Section 27 permits proof of discovery-related information only
- FIR by accused is admissible only to show conduct under Section 8
- Confession is a species of admission governed by Sections 24-30 of Evidence Act
- Section 162 CrPC also bars statements to police during investigation
