Supreme Court Upholds Magistrate's Discretion in Summons Endorsement Under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 130(1) 'Or' Interpreted Disjunctively; Magistrate Not Required to Include Both Clause (a) and Clause (b) Endorsements for Offences Not in Part A of Fifth Schedule.

Case Note & Summary

The Supreme Court heard an appeal by certificate against a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court declining to accept a reference made by the Sessions Judge, Raipur. The appeal concerned the proper interpretation of Section 130(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in proceedings initiated against two appellants for offences punishable under Sections 124 and 112 of the Act. The Station House Officer, Gharsiwa, filed information before the Magistrate First Class, Raipur alleging that on March 10, 1962, the appellants permitted three passengers to occupy the front seat of a public carrier and loaded goods exceeding the sanctioned weight, thereby committing offences under Sections 124 and 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Magistrate issued process for the appellants' appearance by pleader but did not make an endorsement under Section 130(1)(b). The appellants contended that the summons were not in accordance with law because the Magistrate failed to include the clause (b) endorsement, thereby depriving them of the right to plead guilty by registered letter and remit an amount not exceeding Rs.25 without appearing in person. The trial Magistrate rejected this plea and directed the case to proceed further. On a petition by the appellants, the Sessions Judge made a reference to the High Court recommending that the Magistrate's order be set aside as the mandatory requirement of Section 130(1)(b) had not been complied with. The High Court declined the reference, holding that the Magistrate had the option to issue summons with either clause (a) or clause (b) endorsement, not both. The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court by certificate. The central legal issue was whether a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under the Motor Vehicles Act not specified in Part A of the Fifth Schedule must mandatorily make an endorsement under Section 130(1)(b) along with Section 130(1)(a), or whether the use of 'or' in the provision gave the Magistrate discretion to choose only one endorsement. The appellants argued that Section 130(1) was mandatory and that the Magistrate had to inform the accused of both options; failure to do so vitiated the proceedings. The State argued that the provision gave the Magistrate an option to select the appropriate endorsement based on the nature of the offence. The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 130(1), which states that the court shall state upon the summons that the accused 'may appear by pleader and not in person, or may by a specified date prior to the hearing of the charge plead guilty to the charge by registered letter and remit to the Court such sum not exceeding twenty-five rupees as the Court may specify.' The Court held that the word 'or' was disjunctive and could not be read as 'and'. The Magistrate was bound to issue summons of the nature prescribed by sub-section (1), but there was nothing requiring both endorsements. The Court reasoned that interpreting the provision as mandatory for both clauses would be inconsistent with the scheme of the Act. The purpose of Section 130 was to protect minor offenders from harassment by allowing them to avoid court appearance, not to permit serious offenders to escape heavier punishment by paying a maximum of Rs.25. The Court noted that offences under the Act may carry imprisonment or serious penalties; if clause (b) were mandatory, an accused could plead guilty and remit Rs.25, thereby barring further proceedings and disqualification under Section 130(3) and preventing the Magistrate from exercising powers under Section 17 to disqualify the offender from holding a driving licence. The Court also observed that certain offences punishable with imprisonment were not excluded from Section 130(1) by Part A of the Fifth Schedule, and a mandatory clause (b) would allow improper compounding. The Supreme Court thus approved the High Court's view and expressly overruled the contrary decisions of the Allahabad High Court in State of U.P. v. Mangal Singh and the Assam High Court in State of Assam v. Suleman Khan. The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate was not obliged in offences not specified in Part A of the Fifth Schedule to make an endorsement under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 130 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Headnote

Issue of Consideration

Final Decision

Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate is not obliged in offences not specified in Part A of the Fifth Schedule to make an endorsement in terms of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 130 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The view of the High Court was affirmed; contrary decisions in State of U.P. v. Mangal Singh and State of Assam v. Suleman Khan were overruled.

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