Case Note & Summary
The Supreme Court dealt with a criminal appeal by certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court confirming the conviction and sentences of four appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Two appellants were sentenced to death and two to imprisonment for life for the murder of a pradhan at village Behjoi. The Sessions Judge, Moradabad had accepted the prosecution evidence of enmity and eyewitness testimony and convicted the appellants. In the High Court, a Division Bench of two judges differed; Mathur J favoured dismissal of the appeal while Gyanendra Kumar J favoured allowing it. The third judge, Takru J, agreed with Mathur J and dismissed the appeal, but did not discuss in detail the genuineness of the first information report. The appellants applied for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Division Bench again differed on granting the certificate, and a third judge, Broome J, agreed to grant it on the ground that Takru J had not discussed the FIR authenticity. Before the Supreme Court, the State raised a preliminary objection that the certificate was incompetent because it involved only questions of fact and not a substantial question of law. The Court examined the scope of Article 134(1)(c) and Section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It held that under Section 429, the third judge is completely free to decide what points to hear and how to resolve the difference; he may simply agree with one judge without giving detailed reasons. Therefore, the High Court erred in granting certificate based on the third judge's omission. On Article 134(1)(c), the Court reiterated that a certificate requires a substantial question of law or principle, not mere appreciation of evidence; the High Court should be slow to certify and should remember the availability of special leave. The certificate in this case was held incompetent. The Court also considered the argument that when two judges differ on sentence, death sentence should not be imposed without compelling reasons, but rejected any such rule, stating that each case must be decided on its own facts. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction and sentences were confirmed.
Headnote
A) Criminal Procedure - Third Judge in Divided Bench - Section 429 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 - The third judge is completely free to decide on what points to hear arguments and to resolve the difference as he thinks fit; agreeing with one judge without detailed discussion is sufficient. The High Court erred in granting certificate based on the third judge's omission to discuss the first information report; there was a proper decision. Held that the certificate could not be based on such omission. (Para 3) B) Constitutional Law - Certificate of Fitness to Appeal - Article 134(1)(c) Constitution of India - A certificate requires a substantial question of law or principle; mere appreciation of evidence is insufficient. The High Court should be slow to certify and must not overlook the availability of special leave. Held that the present certificate was incompetent as it did not involve a substantial question of law. (Para 4) C) Criminal Law - Death Sentence - Sections 302, 34 Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Difference of opinion between judges on sentence does not automatically warrant a lesser sentence; each case must be decided on its own facts. Held that death sentence was confirmed as the facts justified the extreme penalty. (Para 5)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the certificate of fitness granted by the High Court under Article 134(1)(c) was competent; whether Section 429 CrPC requires the third judge to give detailed reasons when agreeing with one judge; whether death sentence should be reduced due to difference of opinion between judges
Final Decision
Appeal dismissed. Conviction and sentences confirmed. Certificate of fitness under Article 134(1)(c) held incompetent; death sentences maintained.
Law Points
- Section 429 CrPC gives third judge complete freedom to resolve difference and agree with one judge without detailed discussion
- Certificate under Article 134(1)(c) requires substantial question of law or principle
- not mere appreciation of evidence
- High Court should be slow to certify criminal cases
- special leave is available as alternative remedy
- difference of opinion on sentence does not automatically require lesser sentence
- each case decided on own facts



