Supreme Court Dismisses Appeal by Illegitimate Son and Daughter in Punjab Pre-emption Act Case Due to Non-entitlement Under Section 15(2)(b). Statutory Words 'Son or Daughter' in Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, as Amended by Act X of 1960, Construed to Mean Only Legitimate Children, Not Illegitimate Issue, Because No Express Provision or Context Gave Extended Meaning.

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Case Note & Summary

The dispute arose from a sale of agricultural land executed by a female vendor, Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur, who sold 18 bighas, 1 biswas and 5-1/2 biswansis of agricultural land to the respondents by a registered sale deed dated December 1, 1956 for Rs. 10,000. The appellants, her illegitimate son and daughter, filed a suit to pre-empt the sale, claiming a statutory right under Section 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, as amended by Act X of 1960. The trial court and the District Court on appeal granted the appellants a decree for pre-emption, though to a limited extent. The respondents then filed a second appeal to the Punjab High Court, which by judgment dated February 1961 in Regular Second Appeal No. 837 of 1960 directed dismissal of the suit, holding that the appellants were not within the class of persons entitled to pre-emption under Section 15(2)(b). The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. The sole question for determination was whether the words 'son or daughter of such female' in Section 15(2)(b)(i) included an illegitimate son or illegitimate daughter of the female vendor. The appellants contended that Section 15 must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which made provision for the devolution of property belonging to a female owner. Since under that Act illegitimate children of a Hindu female were entitled to succeed to her property, they argued that the expression 'son or daughter' used by the Punjab legislature in 1960 meant a son or daughter who would be entitled to succeed as an heir of a Hindu female. The respondents supported the High Court's view that the plain words did not include illegitimate children. The Supreme Court rejected the appellants' contention. It observed that the normal rule of construction of the words 'child', 'son', or 'daughter' in a statute includes only legitimate children, i.e., those born in wedlock. The court noted that an extended meaning to include illegitimate children might be given if there is an express provision in the statute, such as Section 3(j) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, or if the context indicated that the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely blood relationship apart from legitimacy. However, Section 15 of the Pre-emption Act contained no express provision and the context did not support such a construction. The words 'son or daughter' occurred more than once in Section 15; counsel for the appellants fairly conceded that where the son or daughter of a male vendor was referred to, as in Section 15(1), the words meant only legitimate issue. The court held that there was no reason for the words to have a different connotation in the case of a female vendor. The court also pointed out that Section 15(2)(a)(i) referred to the brother's son of the female vendor, and it could hardly be argued that a brother's illegitimate son was comprehended. The court further rejected the argument based on the Hindu Succession Act by noting that the Pre-emption Act was a statute of general application to all owners regardless of religion; if the construction were made to depend on personal law, a Christian vendor or a convert would lead to different outcomes, which was untenable. The right of pre-emption under Section 15 was not designed to follow the rules of intestate succession. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that when Section 15(2)(b)(i) used the words 'son or daughter', it meant only a legitimate son and a legitimate daughter of the female vendor. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Headnote

A) Statutory Interpretation - Meaning of 'Son or Daughter' - Legitimate vs Illegitimate Children - Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, Section 15(2)(b) - The appeal concerned whether the phrase 'son or daughter of such female' in Section 15(2)(b)(i) includes illegitimate children of a female vendor. The Supreme Court held that the normal rule of construction of the words 'child', 'son', or 'daughter' in a statute includes only legitimate children born in wedlock. Section 15 contains no express provision and no contextual indication to include illegitimate children; the words appear for male vendors too, where the same restricted meaning was conceded, and reference to 'brother's son' also denotes legitimate issue. Held that the words mean only a legitimate son and legitimate daughter of the female vendor, so illegitimate children are not entitled to pre-emption.

B) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Interplay with Punjab Pre-emption Act - Irrelevance of Personal Law of Intestate Succession - Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, Section 15 and Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 3(j) - The appellants contended that Section 15 of the Pre-emption Act must be read with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, where illegitimate children of a Hindu female can inherit. The court rejected this argument because the Pre-emption Act creates a self-contained statutory scheme of pre-emption rights that does not follow heirship under personal law; if the vendor were Christian or converted, different results would follow, showing untenability. Held that the words 'son or daughter' cannot be construed by reference to religion-specific intestate succession rules.

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Issue of Consideration

Whether the words 'son or daughter of such female' in Section 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, as amended by Act X of 1960, include an illegitimate son or illegitimate daughter of such female.

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Final Decision

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The Supreme Court held that when Section 15(2)(b)(i) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, as amended, uses the words 'son or daughter', it meant only a legitimate son and a legitimate daughter of the female vendor, and therefore the illegitimate children were not entitled to pre-emption.

Law Points

  • normal rule of construction includes only legitimate children for child son daughter
  • extended meaning requires express provision or context
  • Section 15 of Punjab Pre-emption Act lacks express provision or contextual support
  • consistent interpretation across section for male and female vendors
  • Hindu Succession Act cannot alter statutory meaning
  • words son or daughter in Section 15(2)(b)(i) mean only legitimate son and legitimate daughter
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Case Details

1964 LawText (SC) (03) 46

Civil Appeal No. 467 of 1963

1964-03-13

N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.C. Shah, S.M. Sikri

1965 AIR 608, 1964 SCR (7) 205

Bishan Narain, Naunit Lal, Yashpal Gandhi, S. D. Goswami

Gulraj Singh

Mota Singh

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Nature of Litigation

Civil appeal by special leave against a Punjab High Court judgment dismissing a pre-emption suit filed by the illegitimate son and daughter of a female vendor in respect of agricultural land sold to the respondents.

Remedy Sought

The appellants sought pre-emption of the sale of agricultural land effected by a registered sale deed dated December 1, 1956, executed by Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur in favor of the respondents, and reversal of the High Court judgment dismissing their suit.

Filing Reason

The respondents purchased the agricultural land from the female vendor; the appellants, as illegitimate son and daughter, claimed a statutory right of pre-emption under Section 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, as amended by Act X of 1960.

Previous Decisions

The trial court and the District Court on appeal granted the appellants a decree for pre-emption to a limited extent. The Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 837 of 1960 directed dismissal of the suit, holding that the appellants were not within the class of persons entitled to pre-emption under Section 15(2)(b). The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.

Issues

Whether the words 'son or daughter of such female' in Section 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, as amended by Act X of 1960, include an illegitimate son or illegitimate daughter of such female.

Submissions/Arguments

The appellants contended that Section 15 of the Pre-emption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which made provision for the devolution of property belonging to a female owner, and since under that Act illegitimate children of a Hindu female were entitled to succeed to her property, the expression 'son or daughter' used by the Punjab legislature in 1960 meant a son or daughter who would be entitled to succeed as an heir of a Hindu female.

Ratio Decidendi

The normal rule of construction of the words 'child', 'son', or 'daughter' in a statute includes only legitimate children born in wedlock. An extended meaning to include illegitimate children requires an express provision in the statute or a context indicating mere blood relationship apart from legitimacy. Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act contains no express provision and no contextual support for such extended meaning. Since the words 'son or daughter' appear in the same section for male vendors, where it was conceded to mean legitimate issue only, consistency requires the same meaning for female vendors; the reference to 'brother's son' in Section 15(2)(a)(i) also implies legitimate son. Therefore, Section 15(2)(b)(i) uses 'son or daughter' to mean only legitimate son and legitimate daughter of the female vendor, and illegitimate children are not entitled to pre-emption.

Judgment Excerpts

The normal rule of construction of the words 'child', 'son' or 'daughter' occurring in a statute would include only legitimate children i.e., born in wedlock, is too elementary to require authority. Section 15 with which we are concerned contains no express provision and the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. The matter appears to us to be too clear for argument that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words 'son or daughter' it meant only a legitimate son and a legitimate daughter of the female vendor.

Procedural History

The appellants filed a suit to pre-empt a sale of agricultural land effected by a registered deed dated December 1, 1956, executed by Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur in favor of the respondents. The trial court and the District Court on appeal granted the appellants a decree for pre-emption to a limited extent. The respondents filed a second appeal to the Punjab High Court, which by judgment dated February 1961 in Regular Second Appeal No. 837 of 1960 directed dismissal of the suit, holding that the appellants were not within the class of persons entitled to pre-emption under Section 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs on March 13, 1964.

Acts & Sections

  • Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913: 15, 15(1), 15(2)(a), 15(2)(b), 15(2)(b)(i)
  • Hindu Succession Act, 1956: 3(j), 15(1), 15(2)
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