Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose from an election to the House of the People from a constituency in Madhya Pradesh. The appellant was elected, and the respondents were other contesting candidates. Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition challenging the appellant's election. The Election Tribunal dismissed the election petition. Against that dismissal, respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal to the High Court under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The appeal was filed more than 30 days after the order of the Election Tribunal, but if the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Tribunal's order was excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the appeal was within time. The appellant contended before the High Court that the respondent was not entitled to exclude the time for obtaining the copy. The High Court rejected this contention, held the appeal to be within time, found the appellant guilty of two corrupt practices, and set aside his election. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. Before the Supreme Court, the only question raised was whether the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act could be invoked for computing the 30-day period prescribed under Section 116-A(3) of the Representation of the People Act. The appellant argued that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act did not apply because the Representation of the People Act did not prescribe a period different from the First Schedule since there was no identical appeal in the First Schedule; that Article 156 did not apply because the appeal was not under the Code of Civil Procedure; and that Section 116-A provided an exhaustive code of limitation, with the proviso to Section 116-A(3) implying exclusion of the Limitation Act. The respondent contended that Section 29(2) applied, Section 12 was attracted, and the appeal was within time. The Supreme Court, by majority, dismissed the appeal. It held that Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act applied to appeals under Section 116-A because the Representation of the People Act is a special law prescribing a period of limitation different from the First Schedule, and it is not necessary that the First Schedule should contain an identical appeal. Further, Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act applied to an appeal to the High Court against the order of the Election Tribunal; an order under Section 98 of the Representation of the People Act, if it contains reasons, is a composite document satisfying the definition of a judgment as well as an order. The Court also held that Section 116-A did not provide an exhaustive code and did not expressly exclude the Limitation Act; the proviso only restored power under Section 29(2)(b) but did not impliedly exclude Section 12. Thus, the time required for obtaining a copy of the Tribunal's order was excludable, the appeal to the High Court was within time, and the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision. The appeal was dismissed.
Headnote
A) Limitation Law - Appeals Under Special Law - Applicability of Section 29(2) - Limitation Act, 1908, Section 29(2) - A special law like Representation of the People Act, 1951 prescribing a period of limitation for an appeal different from the First Schedule attracts Section 29(2), even if no identical appeal period exists in the First Schedule. The Court rejected the argument that an identical appeal must be prescribed in the First Schedule and applied the reasoning of Canara Bank Ltd. v. Warden Insurance Co. Ltd. and State of U.P. v. Kaushaliya. Held that Section 29(2)(a) applied to appeals under Section 116-A. (Paras Not mentioned) B) Limitation Law - Exclusion of Time for Copy of Order - Section 12(2) Applicability - Limitation Act, 1908, Section 12(2); Representation of the People Act, 1951, Sections 98, 116-A - An order of the Election Tribunal under Section 98 containing reasons is a composite document satisfying the definition of a judgment as well as an order, thereby attracting Section 12(2). Time requisite for obtaining a copy of such order should be excluded in computing the 30-day period under Section 116-A(3). Held that Section 12(2) applies to appeals to the High Court against Tribunal orders. (Paras Not mentioned) C) Limitation Law - Exhaustive Code and Express Exclusion - Section 29(2)(a) and Section 116-A(3) - Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 116-A(3); Limitation Act, 1908, Section 29(2)(a) - Section 116-A does not provide an exhaustive and exclusive code of limitation and does not expressly exclude the general provisions of the Limitation Act. The proviso to Section 116-A(3) only restores power under Section 29(2)(b) and does not imply exclusion of Section 12. Held that there is no express or implied exclusion of the Limitation Act provisions. (Paras Not mentioned) D) Limitation Law - Construction of Section 29(2) Two Limbs - Relationship Between First and Second Limb - Limitation Act, 1908, Section 29(2) - The entire sub-section (2) of Section 29 has to be read as an integrated provision; the conjunction 'and' connects the two parts and makes it necessary for attracting clause (a) that the conditions laid down by the opening words of sub-section (2) should be satisfied. Per Subba Rao and Mudholkar JJ., the second limb is wide enough to include suits, appeals or applications under special or local law even if no period of limitation is prescribed in the First Schedule. Held that the provision applied because the special law prescribed a period different from the First Schedule. (Paras Not mentioned) E) Limitation Law - Article 156 and 'Under the Code of Civil Procedure' - Meaning of Appeal under CPC - Limitation Act, 1908, First Schedule Article 156; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - The Court differed on whether an appeal under Section 116-A is an appeal 'under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908' for the purpose of Article 156. Per Ayyangar, Sinha and Subba Rao JJ., an appeal can be under the CPC if the procedure for filing and dealing with the appeal is governed by the CPC, even if the right of appeal is conferred by another statute. Per Raghubar Dayal and Mudholkar JJ., an appeal given by some other law is an appeal under that law, not under the CPC. Held that Article 156 may attract, but the decision did not rest solely on it. (Paras Not mentioned)
Issue of Consideration
Whether time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Election Tribunal's order can be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 in computing the 30-day limitation period for an appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951; whether Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act applies to appeals under Section 116-A; relationship between the two limbs of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act; whether Section 116-A provides an exhaustive code of limitation excluding the Limitation Act
Final Decision
Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of time provided by Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was permissible in computing the 30-day period for filing the appeal under Section 116-A(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act applied, and Section 116-A did not expressly exclude the Limitation Act. The High Court's decision was affirmed.
Law Points
- Time for obtaining certified copy of Tribunal order excluded under Section 12(2) of Limitation Act
- 1908
- Section 29(2)(a) of Limitation Act applies to special laws prescribing different limitation periods
- Section 116-A of Representation of the People Act
- 1951 does not expressly exclude Limitation Act
- Order under Section 98 of Representation of the People Act is composite judgment/order
- Article 156 of Limitation Act schedules may apply to appeals governed by CPC procedure
