Supreme Court Upholds State Action in Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act Case on Constitutionality of Section 20. Statutory provision allowing Magistrate to require removal of prostitutes from certain localities on information from any source and after judicial inquiry held valid under Articles 14 and 19(1)(d)(e) of Constitution.

Case Note & Summary

The appeals arose from proceedings initiated under Section 20 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (the Act) against six respondents alleged to be prostitutes carrying on trade in Kanpur. The City Magistrate, Kanpur, on receiving information from a Sub-Inspector of Police who was not a Special Police Officer appointed under Section 13 of the Act, issued show cause notices under Section 20(1) requiring the respondents to show cause why they should not be removed from their places of residence and prohibited from re-entering those areas. The respondents filed objections asserting that the proceedings were not legally maintainable. The Magistrate rejected the objections, and the Additional Sessions Judge dismissed their revision petitions. The Allahabad High Court, however, allowed the respondents' revisions and set aside the proceedings, holding that Section 20 of the Act abridged the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution. The State of Uttar Pradesh then appealed to the Supreme Court on certificates granted by the High Court. The central legal issues before the Supreme Court were: first, whether the information enabling a Magistrate to act under Section 20 must come only from a Special Police Officer designated under Section 13 of the Act; second, whether Section 20 conferred uncanalized and uncontrolled power on the Magistrate in an executive capacity, thereby violating Article 14; third, whether the classification between prostitutes and non-prostitutes and among prostitutes was permissible under Article 14; and fourth, whether Section 20 imposed unreasonable restrictions on movement and residence, violating Article 19(1)(d) and (e). The respondents argued that the information received by the Magistrate had to originate from a Special Police Officer, and since it came from a Sub-Inspector, the proceedings were invalid. They further contended that Section 20 gave the Magistrate arbitrary executive power to discriminate between prostitutes and to interfere with the lives of respectable women on flimsy evidence. They also claimed that the restrictions on movement and residence were unreasonable and violated their fundamental rights. The State argued that the information could come from any source, that the Magistrate acted judicially with adequate safeguards, and that the restrictions were reasonable and in the interest of the general public. The Supreme Court rejected the respondents' contentions. On the first issue, the Court held that the expression 'on receiving information' in Section 20 was not expressly or by necessary implication limited to information from a Special Police Officer. The absence of limiting language indicated that the source of information was immaterial; information merely triggered a judicial inquiry. The Court also noted the distinction between investigation/arrest, which could have grave consequences, and information to a Magistrate, which only started a judicial process. On the Article 14 challenge, the Court held that Section 20 did not confer uncanalized power on an executive authority. The Magistrate under Section 20 functioned as a court: after issuing notice and giving the woman an opportunity to present evidence, the Magistrate decided two questions—whether the woman was a prostitute and whether it was necessary in the public interest to require her removal. The decision was subject to revision by the Sessions Court or High Court. The Act provided clear policy and guidance. The classification between prostitutes and non-prostitutes, and among prostitutes whose public actions warranted restrictions, was based on intelligible differentia and had a rational relation to the object of suppressing immoral traffic and preventing moral decadence in busy localities. Therefore, Section 20 did not offend Article 14. On the Article 19(1)(d) and (e) challenge, the Court held that the restrictions were reasonable and in the interest of the general public. The vice of prostitution had to be controlled, and the restriction was imposed through a judicial process based on a clearly disclosed policy. The Court held that the Bombay High Court decision in Begum v. State (AIR 1963 Bom 17), insofar as it held that Section 20 encroached upon Article 19(1)(d) and (e), was not correct. In the result, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court judgment, and upheld the constitutional validity of Section 20 of the Act. The proceedings under Section 20 against the respondents were restored.

Headnote

Issue of Consideration

Final Decision

Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court judgment, and upheld the constitutional validity of Section 20. It held that information under Section 20 may be received from any source; the Magistrate acts as a court with procedural safeguards; the classification is reasonable; and restrictions are reasonable in public interest. The proceedings under Section 20 were restored.

Law Points