Supreme Court Dismisses Appeal by Private Complainant in Criminal Limitation Matter — Application for Special Leave Against Acquittal Barred by Time. Section 417(4) CrPC Prescribes Special 60-Day Limitation, Excluding Application of Section 5 Limitation Act Under Section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1908.

Case Note & Summary

The Supreme Court of India, in exercise of criminal appellate jurisdiction, considered whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applied to an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal filed under sub-section (3) of Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The dispute arose after the respondent was committed to the Court of Sessions and tried for offences under Section 493, alternatively Section 495, Indian Penal Code, on allegations that he had deceitfully caused the complainant to believe she was lawfully married and had sexual intercourse, or had concealed a prior marriage. The Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur acquitted the respondent on 31 December 1959, finding that the prosecution failed to prove marriage between the complainant and the accused. The appellant, as private complainant, filed an application on 22 April 1960 seeking special leave to appeal from the acquittal. This was beyond the 60-day period prescribed by Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In a note appended to the application, the appellant stated that time should be excluded because the District Magistrate had moved the Advocate-General to file an appeal under Section 417 CrPC; the State Government declined and intimation was received on 1 April 1960. The High Court admitted the application on 1 September 1960, but at the hearing the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was out of time. The appellant conceded the delay but argued that Section 5 of the Limitation Act allowed condonation and claimed that the Bench had condoned the delay when admitting the appeal. The Division Bench rejected that contention, examined the statutory provisions and precedents, and held that Section 417(4) is a special law of limitation, so Section 5 Limitation Act was not available. The High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred on 31 October 1961. A certificate of fitness was granted due to conflict of opinion among High Courts. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the delay could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The respondent supported the High Court's reasoning. The Court examined Section 417, noting that before the 1955 amendment only the State Government could appeal from acquittal; Act XXVI of 1955 introduced the private complainant's right with special leave and added sub-section (4) imposing a mandatory 60-day limit. The Court observed that State Government appeals under Section 417(1) were governed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act, and Section 5 of that Act applied by its own force; but for private prosecutor appeals, the legislature specifically provided a period of limitation in the Code itself, not in the Limitation Act. The Court reasoned that while the Code of Criminal Procedure as a whole is a general law regulating procedure for criminal trials, Section 417(4) contains a special rule of limitation for a particular class of cases, making it a special law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The Court referred to decisions of various High Courts, including Patna, Bombay, Allahabad, Madras, and Andhra Pradesh, and preferred the view treating Section 417(4) as special law. It held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to condone delay in filing an application for special leave because Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act excludes application of Section 5 where a different period is prescribed by special or local law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court's order, without entering into the merits.

Headnote

Issue of Consideration

Final Decision

Supreme Court dismissed appeal, affirming High Court's decision that application for special leave was barred by time. Held that Section 417(4) CrPC is special law of limitation and Section 5 Limitation Act does not apply to condone delay beyond 60 days.

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