Case Note & Summary
The litigation arose from two requisition notifications issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar at Silchar on December 4 and December 5, 1959, under the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. The petitioner, Paresh Chandra Chatterjee, owned the Urrunabund Tea Estate in village Udarbund, District Cachar, Assam, comprising about 2682 acres, of which 553.73 acres were under tea cultivation; the remaining land was claimed by the petitioner to be utilised for purposes connected with the tea industry, while the respondents stated it was lying fallow and unutilised. The notifications requisitioned 183 bighas and 149 bighas 19 cottahs 11 chattacks of land respectively. The petitioner filed two writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court, seeking writs of mandamus directing the State of Assam and the Deputy Commissioner to forbear from giving effect to the requisition orders. The petitioner raised two principal legal challenges. First, he contended that tea industry is a matter for exclusive legislation by Parliament under Entry 52, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and therefore the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, insofar as it provided for requisition and acquisition of tea estates or lands appertaining to them, was ultra vires the State Legislature. Second, he argued that the Act offended Article 31(2) of the Constitution because it neither provided for payment of compensation for property requisitioned nor specified the principles and manner of determining compensation. The Supreme Court analysed the legislative history. The Assam Act was passed by the Assam Legislature and received the Governor's assent on November 14, 1948, before the Constitution came into force. At that time, it was presumably enacted under Entry 9, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, which related to compulsory acquisition of land. Entry 34, List I of that Act dealt with development of industries where development under Federal control was declared expedient by federal law. No federal law had declared the development of tea industry expedient in the public interest. Therefore, the Act was constitutionally valid when made. Under Article 372 of the Constitution, it continued in force after the Constitution until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature. The Court then considered the Tea Act, 1953, enacted by Parliament under Entry 52, List I, which declared in Section 2 that it was expedient in the public interest for the Union to take the tea industry under its control. The Court compared the two statutes: the Assam Act dealt solely with requisition and speedy acquisition of premises and land for public purposes such as maintaining supplies and services, accommodation, transport, communication, irrigation or drainage; it had nothing to do with tea industry or any industry. The Tea Act, 1953, was mainly concerned with control and development of the tea industry, establishing a Tea Board, regulating cultivation, export, price and distribution. Section 15(1)(b) expressly contemplated compulsory acquisition of part of a tea estate and permitted replacement of acquired land by other land for tea plantation. The Court held that the Tea Act did not alter, repeal or amend the Assam Act, and the two Acts dealt with different matters for different purposes. Thus the State Act remained valid and operative. On the second contention, the Court examined Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Assam Act. Section 7(3) provided for payment of agreed compensation in writing between the Collector and the interested person for requisition and damage during requisition. Section 8 provided that where there was disagreement about compensation, the Collector would refer the matter to the Court, and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, applied mutatis mutandis to such reference. The Court held that these provisions satisfied Article 31(2) because they provided for compensation either by agreement or through a reference to court applying the Land Acquisition Act principles. The adequacy of compensation was expressly made non-justiciable under Article 31(2). Accordingly, the Act did not violate Article 31(2). The Supreme Court rejected both contentions and upheld the constitutional validity of the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. The writ petitions were dismissed.
Headnote
A) Constitutional Law - Legislative Competence - Pre-Constitution State Law Continues Under Article 372 - Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, Sections 3, 4, 6, 7, 8; Tea Act, 1953, Sections 2, 10, 15; Constitution of India, Article 372, Seventh Schedule, List I, Entry 52; Government of India Act, 1935, Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 9 - The petitioner contended that tea industry being an exclusive Union subject under Entry 52 of List I, the Assam Act was ultra vires the State Legislature insofar as it permitted requisition and acquisition of tea estate lands. The Court held that the Assam Act was valid when enacted in 1948 under Entry 9, List II of the Government of India Act, 1935, as no federal law had declared tea industry development to be under federal control; it continued in force under Article 372. The Tea Act, 1953, passed by Parliament for development and control of tea industry, did not alter, repeal or amend the Assam Act; Section 15(1)(b) of the Tea Act expressly contemplated compulsory acquisition of tea land and provided for replacement planting. Held: the Assam Act was not ultra vires the Assam Legislature and the Tea Act did not repeal or amend it. (No paragraph numbers in provided judgment text) B) Constitutional Law - Article 31(2) - Compensation for Requisition of Property - Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, Sections 6, 7, 8; Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 23, 24, 25; Constitution of India, Article 31(2) - The petitioner argued that the Assam Act violated Article 31(2) because it did not provide for payment of compensation or specify principles and manner of determining compensation for requisitioned property. The Court examined Sections 6, 7 and 8 which provided for agreed compensation and, on disagreement, reference to the Court with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 applying mutatis mutandis. The Court held that these provisions satisfied Article 31(2) since they fixed compensation by agreement or provided for determination of compensation by a court applying Land Acquisition Act principles; adequacy of compensation was not justiciable. Held: the Act did not offend Article 31(2) and was valid. (No paragraph numbers in provided judgment text)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 was ultra vires the State Legislature insofar as it provided for requisition and acquisition of tea estate lands, given that tea industry was an exclusive Union subject under Entry 52 of List I; and whether the Act violated Article 31(2) of the Constitution by failing to provide for payment of compensation or specify principles for determining compensation for requisitioned property.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court held that the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 was constitutionally valid and not ultra vires the Assam Legislature. It also held that the Act did not violate Article 31(2) of the Constitution. Both contentions raised by the petitioner were rejected and the writ petitions were dismissed.
Law Points
- Pre-constitution State law continues under Article 372 until altered
- repealed or amended
- Tea Act 1953 does not alter Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act
- 1948
- compensation provisions under Sections 6
- 7
- 8 with Land Acquisition Act 1894 mutatis mutandis satisfy Article 31(2)
- adequacy of compensation not justiciable
- compulsory acquisition/requisition only for public purpose and with compensation



