Case Note & Summary
The appeal arose from a dispute over quasi-permanent allotments of rural evacuee property in Punjab after the partition. The appellants, Joginder Singh and others, were displaced persons who had received quasi-permanent allotments of agricultural land in village Karodian. The dispute concerned whether the Custodian General had jurisdiction to cancel their allotments in revision after an amendment to Rule 14(6) restricted the Custodian's power to cancel such allotments. The appellants and their father Nand Singh were displaced from West Pakistan and initially received temporary allotments in Raikot. Each appellant was allotted 8-1/3 standard acres on quasi-permanent basis in Raikot, while Nand Singh was allotted 41 standard acres and 7 units in Hambran. Nand Singh sought revision but died in 1951; his legal representatives continued but were unsuccessful. Respondents 4 to 9, also displaced persons, had been allotted lands in village Karodian as quasi-permanent allottees. After revenue papers from Pakistan indicated they were entitled to urban allotment, the Deputy Commissioner cancelled their Karodian allotment in 1952 and proposed re-allotment. The Additional Custodian then shifted the appellants' allotments from Raikot and Hambran to Karodian, consolidating the family's land holdings; appellants took possession. Respondents 4 to 9 were given urban lands. Later, respondents applied to have their rural allotment restored, contending their abandoned land was rural. The Additional Custodian dismissed the application, holding that after the July 22, 1952 amendment to Rule 14(6), he could not cancel the appellants' allotment except on specified grounds. The Deputy Custodian General initially opined that if the Additional Custodian lacked power, the Custodian General also lacked power. However, on revision, the Custodian General allowed the application and cancelled the appellants' allotment. The appellants challenged that order in the Punjab High Court under Article 226. A single judge dismissed the writ petition, reasoning that if the cancellation of respondents' allotment was after July 22, 1952, it was inoperative; if the allotment to appellants was after that date, the rule was no bar. The Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal also dismissed, holding that the respondents' earlier cancellation was wrongful and that Rule 14(6) did not prevent the Custodian General from exercising powers under Section 27 to cancel an allotment made after July 22, 1952. The court addressed two core questions: first, whether after July 22, 1952, the Custodian or Custodian General could cancel a quasi-permanent allotment of rural evacuee property except on grounds specified in Rule 14(6); and second, whether the Custodian General's revisional power under Section 27 of the Act extended to cancellation for restitution despite the rule's restriction. The appellants argued that the amended rule removed any power to cancel except for enumerated grounds, and the Custodian General could not exceed that. Respondents contended that Section 27 conferred wide revisional powers unaffected by the rule, and that the rule applied only to allotments made before July 22, 1952, not to the appellants' subsequent allotment. They also argued for an interpretation permitting restitution to those whose allotment was wrongly cancelled. The Supreme Court found the High Court's reasoning unsustainable. It held that the amended Rule 14(6) placed a clear limitation on the Custodian's power to cancel rural quasi-permanent allotments, permitting cancellation only in specified circumstances. Making restitution was not an exception; therefore, the inherent power to cancel for restitution had been abrogated by the rule. The court rejected the argument that the rule applied only to pre-amendment allotments, stating that such a restricted interpretation was not justified by the plain language. On Section 27, the court held that the Custodian General's revisional authority is limited to ensuring legality and propriety of subordinate orders; he cannot pass an order that the Custodian himself was prohibited from making. Thus, because the Custodian could not cancel the appellants' allotment under the rule, the Custodian General likewise lacked power. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and quashed the Custodian General's order cancelling the appellants' allotments. The Court held that the Custodian General had no power to cancel an allotment of rural property made on quasi-permanent basis in a revision against an order of the Custodian made after July 22, 1952, except on grounds mentioned in Rule 14(6), and that the present case did not fall within any of those exceptions.
Headnote
A) Evacuee Property - Quasi-Permanent Allotment - Cancellation Power - Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, Sections 10 and 27; Administration of Evacuee Property Rules, 1950, Rule 14(6) - After July 22, 1952, the Custodian's power to cancel a quasi-permanent allotment of rural evacuee property was confined to the grounds enumerated in the amended rule; making restitution to a prior allottee was not among those grounds. The appellants had been validly allotted the disputed Karodian lands, and the subsequent revisional cancellation by the Custodian General for the benefit of respondents 4 to 9 was beyond the custodian's original jurisdiction. Held that the Custodian General could not do indirectly what the Custodian could not do directly. B) Evacuee Property - Revisional Powers of Custodian General - Section 27 scope - Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, Section 27 - The Custodian General's power to call for records and pass orders is limited to ensuring legality and propriety of orders passed by subordinate authorities; it does not confer independent authority to pass orders that the subordinate could not have passed under the Act and Rules. Since the Additional Custodian lacked power to cancel the appellants' allotment under amended Rule 14(6), the Custodian General's revision order setting aside the allotment was without jurisdiction. C) Statutory Interpretation - Limitation on Inherent Powers - Restitution Exception - Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, Section 10 read with Rule 14(6) - Although courts and tribunals may have inherent power to rectify wrongs, that power can be taken away or restricted by statute; here the amended rule expressly limited cancellation power, thereby abrogating any inherent power to cancel for restitution. The Court rejected the interpretation that the rule applied only to allotments made before the amendment, holding that the plain language covered all cancellations after the amendment. Held that the High Court erred in sustaining the Custodian General's order.
Issue of Consideration
Whether after July 22, 1952 the Custodian or Custodian General hearing an appeal or revision from an order made after that date has the power to cancel an allotment of rural evacuee property on a quasi-permanent basis except upon the grounds set out in Rule 14(6) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Rules, 1950.
Final Decision
Appeal allowed; the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and quashed the Custodian General's order cancelling the appellants' allotments. The Court held that the Custodian General had no power to cancel a quasi-permanent allotment of rural evacuee property after July 22, 1952 except on grounds in Rule 14(6), and that the revisional power under Section 27 could not be used to do what the Custodian was prohibited from doing.
Law Points
- Power of Custodian under Section 10 is subject to the rules
- amended Rule 14(6) restricts cancellation of rural quasi-permanent allotments to specified exceptions
- Section 27 revisional power cannot exceed original power
- restitution is not an exception.
