Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, concerning agricultural land allotments in village Kharwan, District Ambala, to displaced persons from West Pakistan. Dewan Chaman Lal, respondent No. 1, was allotted 152.9 acres on September 1, 1949 in lieu of property left behind in Pakistan. Purshottam Lal Dhawan, the appellant, belonged to a group of evacuees known as the Dhawan Group, each member of which was allotted separate extents in the same village. Before possession, two other persons filed applications for re-allotment citing unequal soil quality, leading to a recommendation by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Ambala, accepted by the Director-General, Rural Rehabilitation on December 2, 1949. The village was divided into four blocks and re-allotted, causing respondent No. 1 to lose his consolidated allotment and receive scattered lands across blocks and villages. Aggrieved, respondent No. 1 filed a review application on September 27, 1950 before the Deputy Commissioner, Ambala, seeking restoration of the original allotment; it was dismissed on May 12, 1951. His revision to the Additional Custodian was dismissed on August 25, 1952. He then filed a revision before the Custodian-General on October 10, 1952 (as per the judgment body; the headnote mentions October 30, 1952), initially making only the Custodian a party. By order dated August 25, 1953, the Dhawan Group was impleaded, with notices issued; the group raised objections including limitation and lack of power. The Deputy Custodian-General, by order dated September 29, 1954, cancelled the re-allotment in favour of the Dhawan Group regarding excess area and directed consolidation of respondent No. 1's allotment in village Kharwan. The appellant challenged this order by special leave before the Supreme Court. Two legal issues were framed: whether the revision was barred by time against the Dhawan Group, impleaded after the sixty-day period under Rule 31(5); and whether the Deputy Custodian-General had power to cancel an allotment made on December 2, 1949, given the restrictions in Rule 14(6). The appellant argued that the revision was time-barred as to the Dhawan Group and that no condonation of delay was sought, and that the allotment could not be cancelled after July 22, 1952. The respondent contended that the revision was filed in time against the Custodian, the impleading of the Dhawan Group was for natural justice, Rule 31(5) was directory, and the second proviso to Rule 14(6) empowered the Custodian-General in revision to cancel pre-July 22, 1952 allotments. The Supreme Court held that Section 27 of the Act confers plenary revisional power on the Custodian-General exercisable at any time, either suo motu or on application, and that Rule 31(5) uses 'ordinarily', indicating only a guidance period of sixty days, not a statutory limitation. The court reasoned that a contrary construction would render the rule ultra vires; Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply because no limitation period was prescribed. The Custodian-General's discretion to entertain a revision after sixty days was judicial and had been exercised reasonably; the Dhawan Group was afforded a hearing. On the second issue, Rule 14(6) prohibited the Custodian from cancelling allotments after July 22, 1952 except in specified circumstances, but the second proviso expressly permitted the Custodian-General in exercise of revisional powers under Section 27 to cancel an allotment made by a lower authority on or before July 22, 1952. The allotment dated December 2, 1949 fell within that proviso. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the order of the Deputy Custodian-General was upheld.
Headnote
A) Administrative Law - Revisional Jurisdiction - Scope and Time Limit - Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, Section 27; Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950, Rule 31(5) - Section 27 confers plenary power of revision on Custodian-General exercisable 'at any time'; Rule 31(5) uses 'ordinarily' making sixty days a guidance, not a mandatory limitation. The Court held that the Custodian-General did not act perversely or unreasonably in entertaining the revision despite the Dhawan Group being impleaded after sixty days. Held that revision was not barred by time. (Paras not mentioned) B) Limitation Law - Applicability of Section 5 Limitation Act to Revisions - Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, Section 27; Limitation Act, 1908, Section 5 - Since Rule 31(5) does not prescribe a period of limitation for revision, Section 5 of Limitation Act has no application; the principle underlying it cannot be imported. The court reasoned that applying a rigid time limit by rule would conflict with the statute and render the rule ultra vires. Held that the rule is valid only when read as directory, not mandatory. (Paras not mentioned) C) Evacuee Property - Cancellation of Allotment - Revisional Power to Cancel - Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, Sections 11, 27; Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950, Rule 14(6) second proviso - Rule 14(6) prohibited Custodian from cancelling allotment after July 22, 1952 except specified circumstances, but the second proviso expressly permitted Custodian-General in revision to cancel allotment made by lower authority on or before July 22, 1952. The court held that the Deputy Custodian-General had power to cancel the re-allotment dated December 2, 1949 by his order dated September 29, 1954. Held that the cancellation was within jurisdiction. (Paras not mentioned)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the revision application to the Custodian-General was barred by time, particularly against the Dhawan Group who were impleaded after sixty days; Whether the Deputy Custodian-General had power to cancel an allotment made on December 2, 1949 on the date of his order under Rule 14(6) and Section 27
Final Decision
Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Deputy Custodian-General. Held that the revision was not barred by time as Rule 31(5) prescribes only an ordinary period of sixty days, not a mandatory limitation; the Custodian-General exercised discretion reasonably. Further held that the Custodian-General had power to cancel the allotment under Section 27 read with second proviso to Rule 14(6), as the allotment was made by a lower authority on or before July 22, 1952.
Law Points
- Section 27 of Administration of Evacuee Property Act
- 1950 confers plenary power of revision on Custodian-General exercisable at any time
- Rule 31(5) of Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules
- 1950 prescribes sixty days as rule of guidance
- not a period of limitation
- word 'ordinarily' in Rule 31(5) indicates discretion
- Section 5 of Limitation Act
- 1908 has no application to revision petitions under Section 27 as no limitation period is prescribed
- Custodian-General's revisional power includes power to cancel an allotment made by lower authority on or before July 22
- 1952 under second proviso to Rule 14(6)
