Case Note & Summary
This civil appeal arose from a suit filed in 1920 by the respondent against the appellants concerning village Timmapet in the former Hyderabad State. The respondent claimed that the village had been granted as a jagir by the Nizam to his ancestor in 1787 and later to his son in 1811, and that in 1817 the respondent's ancestor granted a lease (kowl) of the village to the appellants' ancestor for a fixed annual sum of Rs 1027-10-0. The respondent asserted that the lease was not permanent and enured only for the lifetime of the grantor. The appellants resisted, claiming that the Nizam had granted them a bilmakta sanad including the village, giving them permanent possession subject only to payment of pan makta, and alternatively that they had acquired a permanent leasehold right by adverse possession. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent for possession and mesne profits at Rs 931-12-0 per year, holding that the village was not included in the bilmakta sanad and that the appellants could not claim permanent lease rights. In the High Court, the division bench differed: one judge agreed with the trial court on title and limitation and favored higher mesne profits, while the other judge held for the appellants. A third judge, Ansari J., agreed with the first judge on title and limitation but, because the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, No. LXIX of 1358-F, had come into force in 1951, held that the respondent could not obtain possession and was entitled to compensation. A Full Bench upheld Ansari J.'s view on relief, and the appellants obtained a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered two main questions. First, whether the village was included in the bilmakta sanad granted by the Nizam to the appellants, which would give them permanent possession subject only to payment of pan makta. The Court found no merit in this claim based on the evidence and upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and the majority of the High Court. Second, whether the appellants had perfected title by adverse possession to the limited right of being permanent lessees. The Court relied on the principle that although a limited interest could be acquired by adverse possession, no permanent lease could ordinarily be acquired in a jagir because a jagir is presumed to enure for the life-time of the grantee unless the grant itself shows otherwise. The Court also held that a jagirdar could not grant a lease beyond his lifetime unless specifically empowered by the sanad or the law of the State; therefore, adverse possession against one jagirdar could not be tacked to that against another, and limitation started against each grantee from the date of his title. The Court referred to earlier decisions including Sankaran v. Periasami, Thakore Fatehsingji Dipsangji v. Bamanji Ardeshir Dalal, Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periayanan Chetti, Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. The Collector of Surat, Raje Vinaykrao Nemiwant Brahmin v. Raje Shriniwasrao Nemiwant Brahmin, Ahmad-un-Nissa Begum v. State, and Jagdish Narayan v. Nawab Saeed Ahmed Khan. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the respondent was entitled to compensation rather than possession due to the abolition of jagirs.
Headnote
A) Limitation - Adverse Possession of Limited Interest - Article 144 Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - Although a limited interest in property can be acquired by adverse possession, no permanent lease can ordinarily be acquired by adverse possession in a jagir because a jagir is presumed to enure for the life-time of the grantee unless the grant itself shows otherwise. Held that the appellants could not establish adverse possession of a permanent leasehold right. B) Limitation - Tacking of Adverse Possession Periods - Article 144 Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - A jagirdar could not grant a lease beyond his lifetime unless specifically empowered by the sanad or law; therefore, adverse possession against one jagirdar could not be tacked to adverse possession against another, and limitation started against each grantee from the date of his title. Held that the suit was not barred by limitation. C) Jagir Grants - Hereditary Character - Jagirs in former Hyderabad State - Jagirs granted by the State were not permanent and hereditary in character by default; the State generally had the right to resume the grant, and each grantee in a continuing family succession held for his life. Held that the respondent's ancestors held the jagir for life only. D) Title - Bilmakta Sanad - Hyderabad Jagir Lands - The appellants failed to prove that the village Timmapet was included in the bilmakta sanad granted by the Nizam. Held that the trial court and majority High Court findings rejecting permanent lease rights were correct. E) Relief - Abolition of Jagirs - Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, No. LXIX of 1358-F - Upon abolition of jagirs, possession could not be granted to the respondent, who was entitled to compensation payable on abolition. Held that the High Court's modification of relief to compensation was upheld.
Issue of Consideration
Whether the village Timmapet was included in the bilmakta sanad granted by the Nizam to the appellants, giving them permanent possession subject to payment of pan makta; whether the appellants perfected title by adverse possession to the limited right of being permanent lessees from the respondent.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision that the respondent was entitled to compensation instead of possession due to the abolition of jagirs. The appellants' claims of a bilmakta sanad and adverse possession of a permanent lease were rejected.
Law Points
- Title to a limited interest in property can be acquired by adverse possession
- but no permanent lease can ordinarily be acquired by adverse possession in a jagir because a jagir is presumed to enure for the life-time of the grantee unless the grant shows otherwise
- a jagirdar cannot grant a lease beyond his lifetime unless specifically empowered
- adverse possession against one jagirdar cannot be tacked to adverse possession against another
- limitation starts against each grantee from the date of his title
- jagirs in former Hyderabad State were not permanent and hereditary by default
