Case Note & Summary
The appeals arose from writ petitions filed by teaching staff of Banaras Hindu University challenging resolutions of the Executive Council terminating their services. The University had been facing deterioration in affairs, prompting the President of India as Visitor to appoint a Committee of Enquiry (Mudaliar Committee), which recommended a Screening Committee to review teaching staff appointments. An Ordinance in 1958 amended the Banaras Hindu University Act, 1915, introducing Statute No. 30, which set up a Screening Committee and later, after re-enactment by the Banaras Hindu University (Amendment) Act, 1958, provided a detailed procedure: if the Executive Council had reason to believe that a person's continuance in office was detrimental, it could refer the case to the Solicitor-General; if the Solicitor-General found a prima facie case, the matter went to a Reviewing Committee; after inquiry and hearing, the Reviewing Committee forwarded recommendations to the Executive Council, which was to take such action thereon as it may think fit. Apart from Statute No. 30, the Executive Council could also terminate employment under contracts or Ordinance No. 6 with four or six months' notice or salary in lieu. The appellants' cases were processed under Statute No. 30; some received show-cause notices based on Reviewing Committee findings, but appellants 2, 4, 5, 6 did not. Appellants 1, 3, 7, 8 filed writ petitions in Allahabad High Court and obtained stay; the Executive Council passed Resolution No. 89 postponing consideration of their cases until disposal of the writ petitions. However, on May 15, 1960, the Executive Council passed Resolutions Nos. 90, 94-96, 99-102 terminating the services of all appellants, invoking employment agreements and Ordinance No. 6, with pay in lieu of notice. The appellants challenged these resolutions as ultra vires, arguing that the Executive Council could not switch to Ordinance No. 6 after initiating Statute No. 30, that Ordinance No. 6 was subordinate to Statute No. 30, that action against some appellants was stayed by the High Court and Resolution No. 89, and that the action was mala fide. The University contended that it could choose among agreements, Ordinance No. 6, or Statute No. 30 at its option. The Supreme Court held that the impugned resolutions were ultra vires and quashed them. It reasoned that the power of terminating services without notice could not be invoked when allegations had been made and scrutinised under Statute No. 30 and the matter was pending before the Executive Council. The Ordinances were expressly subject to the Statutes, and Ordinance No. 6 could not prevail over Statute No. 30. The words 'shall take such action thereon as it may think fit' in Statute No. 30 gave liberty of action on the recommendations but imposed a duty to form an opinion; they did not give discretion to take action outside the Statute. The court emphasized that it was concerned with legality, not motives, citing Short v. Poole Corporation. The appeals were allowed, and the termination resolutions were quashed.
Headnote
A) Administrative Law - Scope of Statutory Power - Duty to Form Opinion on Recommendations - Banaras Hindu University Act, 1915 (as amended by Banaras Hindu University (Amendment) Act, 1958), Statute No. 30 - Statute No. 30 required the Executive Council, on receipt of the Reviewing Committee's recommendations, to take such action thereon as it may think fit. The Supreme Court held that these words gave liberty of action on the recommendations but imposed a duty to form an opinion; they did not confer discretion to take action outside the Statute. Held that the Executive Council could not bypass the special procedure by invoking general powers under Ordinance No. 6 or employment agreements. (Paras not numbered) B) University Law - Subordination of Ordinances to Statutes - Ordinances Cannot Prevail Over Statutes - Banaras Hindu University Act, 1915, Ordinance No. 6 and Statute No. 30 - The power of the University to terminate services without notice under Ordinance No. 6 was expressly subject to the Statutes of the University. The Supreme Court held that Ordinance No. 6 was subordinate to Statute No. 30 and could not prevail where Statute No. 30 applied. Held that the impugned resolutions terminating services under Ordinance No. 6 or agreements were ultra vires. (Paras not numbered) C) Service Law - Termination of Services - Special Procedure Initiated Cannot Be Abandoned - Banaras Hindu University Act, 1915 (as amended), Statute No. 30; Banaras Hindu University Act, 1915, Ordinance No. 6 - Once allegations of conduct detrimental to the University's interests had been made and scrutinised by the Solicitor-General and the Reviewing Committee and the matter was pending before the Executive Council, the Executive Council could not resort to the general power of termination without notice. Held that the power of terminating services without notice could not be invoked in such circumstances. (Paras not numbered) D) Judicial Review - Ultra Vires Action - Legality Not Motives - Constitution of India, Article 226 - The Supreme Court held that action taken by a public body like the University could only be questioned if it was ultra vires; proof of alien or irrelevant motive was an example of the ultra vires character of the action. The court was concerned with legality, not with motives or justice. Relied on Short v. Poole Corporation. Held that the resolutions were quashed as ultra vires. (Paras not numbered)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the Executive Council of Banaras Hindu University could terminate the services of employees under Ordinance No. 6 or employment agreements after initiating action under Statute No. 30; whether Ordinance No. 6 was subordinate to Statute No. 30; whether the action was mala fide and ultra vires
Final Decision
The Supreme Court held that the impugned resolutions were ultra vires and quashed them. The power of terminating services without notice could not be invoked where allegations had been made and scrutinised under Statute No.30 and matter was pending before Executive Council. The Ordinances were expressly subject to Statutes and could not prevail. The words 'shall take such action thereon as it may think fit' in Statute No.30 gave liberty of action on recommendations but imposed duty to form opinion; no discretion to act outside the Statute. The court was concerned with legality, not motives.
Law Points
- Ordinances subordinate to Statutes
- special statutory procedure cannot be bypassed
- 'shall take such action thereon as it may think fit' imports duty to form opinion but not discretion to act outside statute
- court examines legality not motives
- ultra vires action invalid
