Case Note & Summary
The case arose from the election to the 76 Aligarh Parliamentary constituency in the Lok Sabha general elections held in March 1971. The appellant, Mohd. Yunus Saleem, a defeated Congress(R) candidate, challenged the election of the returned candidate, Shiv Kumar Shastri of B.K.D., by filing an election petition before the Allahabad High Court under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The constituency comprised five assembly segments: Aligarh, Koil, Iglas, Khair, and Chandaus. Polling was scheduled on 1st March 1971 for Aligarh and Koil, and 3rd March 1971 for the remaining three segments. Polling in Aligarh and Koil was completed peacefully, but on 2nd March 1971 a communal riot occurred in Aligarh city. Consequently, the Election Commission postponed the poll in the remaining three segments from 3rd March to 9th March 1971. After the rescheduled poll, the first respondent obtained a very high percentage of votes and was declared elected. The appellant alleged several corrupt practices, including that the second respondent, Pooran Singh Malan, a Samyukt Socialist Party candidate sponsored by a four-party alliance, was induced to withdraw from the contest on 6th March 1971 by offers of a legislative council seat and money from the first respondent and a financier. The appellant also contended that the Election Commissioner had no power to alter the date of poll. The High Court framed several issues including the legality of the adjournment of poll, the bribery for withdrawal, inducement of voters by threats, appeals on religious grounds, false statements, and corrupt practices under Section 123(1) to (4) of the Act. The High Court dismissed the election petition on 21st December 1971. On appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 116-A, the court considered three primary legal issues. First, whether the Election Commission had jurisdiction to alter the poll date. The court held that Sections 57 and 58 of the Representation of the People Act, which deal with adjournment of poll due to riot or natural calamity, were not applicable because they operate only at the polling station level and after the poll has commenced. Section 153 only provides for extension of time for completion of election, not alteration of poll date. However, Section 30 of the Act read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which empowers the authority to add, amend, vary, or rescind notifications, gave the Election Commission the necessary power to alter the date of poll. The court further held that the amendment of the poll date gets engrafted in the original notification, and no fresh notification under the Conduct of Election Rules was necessary. Second, the court examined whether bribery to induce a person to withdraw from being a candidate after the last date fixed for withdrawal of candidature would amount to corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(a). The court held that the expression 'to withdraw from being a candidate' is not limited to a candidate who has validly nominated and withdrawn earlier according to law. The words are of wide amplitude and include subsequent withdrawal even at the last stage prior to poll. The deletion of the words 'retire from contest' from the original section was not significant because the dictionary meaning of 'withdraw' includes 'to retire from contest', and the words were deleted as unnecessary. Giving a narrow meaning to 'withdraw' would defeat the object of purity of elections and create an absurd situation where actual withdrawal after the time limit by taking bribe would be free from corrupt practice, whereas that prior to it would not be. Therefore, if the facts regarding the offers were established, it would amount to corrupt practice. Third, on the appreciation of evidence, the court held that in an election appeal under Section 116-A, the Supreme Court must have convincing and clinching reasons to take a contrary view from the High Court on oral testimony. Strict proof of allegations is required. The High Court had rightly declined to accept the oral evidence of the appellant's side and preferred the respondent's side. Accordingly, no corrupt practice was proved to have been committed by the first respondent under Section 123(1) to (4) of the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment and upholding the election of the returned candidate.
Headnote
A) Election Law - Election Commission's Power to Alter Poll Date - Section 30 of Representation of the People Act, 1951 read with Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897 - Power to alter date of poll - Election Commission had power to alter the date of poll from 3rd March to 9th March 1971 in remaining constituencies; Sections 57 and 58 of the Act were not applicable as they cover specific circumstances like riot or natural calamity at polling station, and Section 153 only extends time for completion of election, not alteration of poll date; Held that Section 30 read with Section 21 of General Clauses Act gives necessary power to Election Commissioner to alter the date of poll, and amendment gets engrafted in original notification without fresh notification under Conduct of Election Rules. (Paras not mentioned) B) Election Law - Corrupt Practice of Bribery for Withdrawal - Section 123(1)(A)(a) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Withdrawal from being a candidate - Bribery to induce a person to withdraw from being a candidate at an election amounts to corrupt practice within meaning of Section 123(1)(A)(a); expression 'to withdraw from being a candidate' is not limited to validly nominated candidate who has withdrawn earlier according to law; words are of wide amplitude to include subsequent withdrawal even at last stage prior to poll; deletion of words 'retire from contest' is not significant as 'withdraw' includes 'retire from contest'; Held that giving narrow meaning to word 'withdraw' would defeat object of purity of elections. (Paras not mentioned) C) Evidence - Appreciation of Oral Testimony in Election Appeals - Section 116-A of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Standard of proof - In an appeal under Section 116-A, Supreme Court must have convincing and clinching reasons to take a contrary view from High Court on oral testimony; strict proof of allegations is required; Held that High Court rightly declined to accept oral evidence of appellant's side and preferred respondent's side, hence no corrupt practice was proved. (Paras not mentioned)
Issue of Consideration
Whether Election Commission had jurisdiction to alter date of poll from 3rd March to 9th March 1971; Whether bribe for withdrawal after the date fixed for withdrawal of candidature amounts to corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(a) of Representation of the People Act, 1951; Whether corrupt practices alleged against returned candidate were proved
Final Decision
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the judgment of Allahabad High Court. Held that Election Commission had power to alter date of poll under Section 30 read with Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897, and no fresh notification was necessary. Held that bribery for withdrawal after the last date fixed for withdrawal would amount to corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(a) if proved, but on evidence no corrupt practice was established. The election of returned candidate was upheld.
Law Points
- Election Commission has power to alter poll date under Section 30 of Representation of the People Act
- 1951 read with Section 21 of General Clauses Act
- 1897
- Bribery to induce withdrawal from being a candidate is corrupt practice even if withdrawal occurs after last date fixed for withdrawal under Section 123(1)(A)(a) of Representation of the People Act
- 1951
- In appeal under Section 116-A
- Supreme Court will not reverse High Court's appreciation of oral evidence unless convincing and clinching reasons exist
