Supreme Court Dismisses Insurer's Appeal Against Extension of Time for Arbitration in Insurance Claim Dispute. Extension of time under Section 37(4) of Arbitration Act, 1940 granted as refusal would cause undue hardship to claimant whose conduct was reasonable and bona fide, despite police report alleging false robbery.

In Favour of Prosecution
  • 2
Judgement Image
Font size:
Print

Case Note & Summary

The appellant, an insurance company, appealed against an order of the Calcutta High Court which allowed an application under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for extension of time to refer a dispute to arbitration. The respondent, a common carrier of goods, held a freight policy issued by the appellant covering loss or damage to goods during transit. In June 1971, the respondent declared a consignment of 185 packages valued at approximately Rs. 1,10,000 for transportation from Calcutta to Assam and Tripura, paying the requisite premium. On the night of 29 June 1971, the truck loaded with the consignment allegedly was robbed near Barasat, and the truck, driver, and merchandise could not be traced. The respondent informed the police and the insurer promptly. The insurer initially sought particulars and later, after receiving a police investigation report stating the robbery was false, disclaimed liability by letter dated 16 February 1973. The respondent wrote on 30 March 1973 asking for grounds of rejection, but the insurer replied on 30 May 1973 that it had nothing to add. The respondent then sought legal advice and filed an application under Section 37(4) on 17 August 1973 for extension of time to refer the dispute to arbitration. The High Court allowed the application, extending time to refer the dispute to arbitration within a fortnight from 14 January 1974. The insurer appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave, contending that Section 37(4) had no application, that the court had no jurisdiction to extend time, and that there were no valid grounds for extension. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had power under Section 37(4) and that the discretion was properly exercised. The Court interpreted 'undue hardship' liberally, stating 'undue' means something not merited by the conduct of the claimant or very much disproportionate to it. Both the amount at stake and the reasons for delay are material; mere bar of claim does not by itself amount to undue hardship. The respondent's conduct was reasonable: it promptly informed police and insurer, sought grounds of rejection, and waited for a reply before deciding on arbitration. The respondent had also filed a suit against the truck owner and paid claims arising from the loss of other goods transported by the same truck, showing bona fides. No material prejudice would be caused to the insurer by extending time. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Headnote

A) Arbitration - Extension of Time - Undue Hardship - Arbitration Act, 1940, Section 37(4) - The court must take a liberal view of the words 'undue hardship'; 'undue' means something which is not merited by the conduct of the claimant or is very much disproportionate to it. Both the amount at stake and the reasons for delay are material in considering undue hardship; the mere fact that a claim would be barred is not itself sufficient. Held that extension of time was proper as refusal would cause undue hardship to a claimant whose conduct was reasonable and bona fide, and no material prejudice would be caused to the insurer (Paras 1-10).

B) Insurance - Claim Rejection and Delay - Reasonableness of Conduct - Arbitration Act, 1940, Section 37(4) - The respondent's conduct in seeking grounds of rejection from the insurer was reasonable; only after the grounds of rejection were known could the respondent decide whether to resort to arbitration. Delay due to waiting for grounds and taking legal advice did not amount to lack of promptness. Held that the High Court exercised its discretion properly in extending time, as the respondent took all steps it could and there was no lack of bona fides (Paras 1-10).

Subscribe to unlock Headnote Subscribe Now

Issue of Consideration

Whether the High Court had power under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to extend the time for referring the dispute to arbitration, and if so, whether the discretion was properly exercised in extending the time given the facts and circumstances of the case.

Subscribe to unlock Issue of Consideration Subscribe Now

Final Decision

The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Calcutta High Court extending the time to refer the dispute to arbitration within a fortnight from 14 January 1974. The Court held that the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 37(4) and had properly exercised its discretion, as refusal to extend time would cause undue hardship to the respondent whose conduct was reasonable and bona fide.

Law Points

  • Section 37(4) of Arbitration Act
  • 1940 empowers court to extend time for referring dispute to arbitration if refusal would cause undue hardship
  • 'undue hardship' must be liberally construed
  • 'undue' means something not merited by conduct of claimant or very much disproportionate to it
  • both amount at stake and reasons for delay are material
  • mere fact that claim would be barred is not by itself undue hardship
  • court has discretion to extend time where claimant's conduct is reasonable and bona fide and no material prejudice caused to other party
Subscribe to unlock Law Points Subscribe Now

Case Details

1974 LawText (SC) (12) 3

Civil Appeal No. 535 of 1974

1974-12-19

Kuttyil Kurien Mathew, P.N. Bhagwati, N.L. Untwalia

1975 AIR 415, 1975 SCR (3) 136, 1975 SCC (1) 603

S.T. Desai, B.P. Maheshwari, Sharad Manohar, Suresh Sethi for appellant; Somnath Chatterjee, P.K. Mukherjee for respondent

Sterling General Insurance Co. Ltd.

Planters Airways Pvt. Ltd.

Subscribe to unlock Case Details (Citation, Judge, Date & more) Subscribe Now

Nature of Litigation

Appeal by special leave against an order of the Calcutta High Court allowing an application under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for extension of time to refer a dispute to arbitration.

Remedy Sought

The respondent sought extension of time to refer the insurance claim dispute to arbitration; the appellant contended that Section 37(4) had no application, the court had no jurisdiction to extend time, and there were no valid grounds for extension.

Filing Reason

The insurance claim was rejected by the appellant, and the respondent needed to refer the dispute to arbitration but the time for doing so had lapsed; the respondent sought extension due to delay in obtaining grounds of rejection from the insurer.

Previous Decisions

The Calcutta High Court, by order dated 14 January 1974, extended the time to refer the dispute to arbitration within a fortnight from that date; the appellant appealed against this order to the Supreme Court.

Issues

Whether the High Court had power under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to extend the time for referring the dispute to arbitration. Whether the exercise of discretion to extend time was proper given the facts, and whether refusal to extend would cause undue hardship to the respondent.

Submissions/Arguments

Appellant contended that Section 37(4) had no application, the court had no jurisdiction to extend time, and even if jurisdiction existed, there were no valid grounds for extension; no undue hardship would be caused if time was not extended. Respondent argued that its conduct was reasonable: it promptly informed police and insurer, sought grounds of rejection, and only after grounds were known could decide whether to resort to arbitration; delay was not due to lack of promptness; refusal would cause undue hardship.

Ratio Decidendi

Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 must be construed liberally; 'undue hardship' means something which is not merited by the conduct of the claimant or is very much disproportionate to it. Both the amount at stake and the reasons for delay are material; the mere fact that a claim would be barred is not itself undue hardship. The court has discretion to extend time where the claimant's conduct is reasonable and bona fide and no material prejudice is caused to the other party.

Judgment Excerpts

Court has to take a liberal view of the meaning of the words 'undue hardship' occurring in section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 'Undue' must mean something which is not merited by the conduct of the claimant, or is very much disproportionate to it. Both the amount at stake and the reasons for delay are material in considering the question of undue hardship. It cannot be said that any material prejudice would be caused to the appellant by extending the time.

Procedural History

On 1 July 1971 and 21 September 1971, the respondent lodged claims for loss with the appellant. The appellant disclaimed liability by letter dated 16 February 1973. The respondent wrote on 30 March 1973 asking for grounds of rejection, but the appellant replied on 30 May 1973 stating it had nothing to add. Thereafter, the respondent took advice of solicitors and counsel and filed an application under Section 37(4) on 17 August 1973 before the High Court for extension of time to refer the dispute to arbitration. The High Court by order dated 14 January 1974 extended the time to refer the dispute to arbitration within a fortnight from that date. The appellant appealed by special leave to the Supreme Court.

Acts & Sections

  • Arbitration Act, 1940: Section 37(4)
Subscribe to unlock full Legal Analysis Subscribe Now
Related Judgement
Supreme Court Supreme Court Upholds Reinstatement Order in Section 33A Complaint as Equivalent to Reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Industrial Tribunal Possesses Full Powers to Direct Reinstatement on Application Under Section 33A During...
Related Judgement
Supreme Court Supreme Court Allows Prosecution Appeal in Bail Cancellation Case, Holding Default Bail Can Be Cancelled on Merits After Chargesheet. Bail granted under Section 167(2) CrPC is deemed under Chapter XXXIII, permitting cancellation under Section 439(2) ...