Case Note & Summary
Background: This civil appeal before the Supreme Court arose out of a suit for partition of joint family properties. The plaintiffs (appellants) sought partition; the first defendant (respondent, since deceased) contested, claiming exclusive ownership of certain disputed items. The central dispute concerned a shop-room at the northern-western corner of plot No. 1238 and certain properties in Schedule C covered by four usufructuary mortgages (Exhibits B-1 to B-4). Facts: In the partition suit, the trial court accepted the first defendant's exclusive ownership based on admissions made by the first plaintiff and the eighth defendant (father of the plaintiffs) in an earlier title suit (Title Suit No. 61 of 1945). Those admissions included the deposition of the first plaintiff (Exhibit G), deposition of the eighth defendant (Exhibit G2), and the written statement filed by the present eighth defendant together with present plaintiffs in that earlier suit (Exhibit H). From these admissions, the courts inferred that a partition had taken place in 1938 and the disputed shop-room had been allotted to defendant No. 1, and the mortgaged lands also belonged to him exclusively. The trial court partially upheld the first defendant's possession of the shop-building but did not fully accept his rights; however, the Patna High Court in appeal held that the same admissions operated against the plaintiffs regarding the shop-building as well. The High Court affirmed the trial court's findings on the mortgaged lands and also concluded the shop-room was allotted to defendant No. 1 in the 1938 partition. Legal Issues: The appellants raised two principal contentions in the Supreme Court: first, that the courts below relied on admissions not suggested in the written statement and at variance from the pleadings; second, that the admissions were not put to the first plaintiff when he was in the witness box nor to the eighth defendant who was not summoned, resulting in prejudice. Arguments: The appellants argued that the statements were vague and insufficient; that the first respondent's basic defence was denial of joint family ownership, and the alternative case based on admissions was a new case at total variance from pleadings; and that the admissions should have been confronted under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. The respondent supported the concurrent findings. Court's Analysis: The Supreme Court rejected the grievances. It found no volte-face by the first defendant: the trial court had considered and acted upon Exhibits G, G2 and H, and the appellants had not raised any plea of prejudice before the High Court or in their grounds for certificate or statement of case in this Court. On the legal question, the Court drew a cardinal distinction between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness who is examined and sought to be discredited. An admission by a party is substantive evidence if it fulfills Section 21 of the Evidence Act, and there is no requirement to put it to the party; it is evidence proprio vigore. A prior statement used to contradict a witness under Section 145 merely discredits credibility and must be put to the witness before the court can disbelieve him. The Court followed Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 606, which held that admissions are substantive evidence by themselves under Sections 17 and 21, though not conclusive proof, and are admissible irrespective of whether the party appeared as a witness or was confronted. Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the reliance on admissions was proper and the concurrent findings should not be disturbed. However, because the first respondent had throughout in pleadings set out a case against the joint family character of properties and only at the stage of evidence fell back on the alternative case, the Court directed that the appellants shall pay only half the costs in this Court.
Headnote
A) Evidence Law - Admissions - Party's prior depositions and written statement in earlier suit are substantive evidence under Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; no requirement to confront the party under Section 145 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 17 and 21 - In a partition suit, admissions made by the first plaintiff and the eighth defendant in Title Suit No. 61 of 1945 were relied upon to hold that disputed shop-room and mortgaged lands belonged exclusively to the first defendant; the Supreme Court rejected the contention that such admissions could not be used because they were not put to the plaintiff or the eighth defendant, holding that party admissions are evidence proprio vigore and admissible irrespective of whether the party appeared as a witness or was confronted. Held that the reliance on admissions was proper and the concurrent findings were upheld (Pages 125-127). B) Evidence Law - Prior Contradictory Statements - Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 applies only to discredit a witness's credibility, not to party admissions; prior statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence - Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 145 - The court distinguished between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness sought to be discredited by a prior statement; for party admissions, no confrontation is required, whereas for a witness, the prior contradictory statement must be put to him under Section 145 before the court can disbelieve him. Followed Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 606. Held that the grievance based on Section 145 was misconceived and the appeal failed (Pages 126-128).
Issue of Consideration
Whether the courts below erred in relying on admissions made by the plaintiffs and the eighth defendant in an earlier suit not specifically pleaded and not put to them; whether such admissions could be used as substantive evidence under Sections 17, 21 and 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Final Decision
Appeal dismissed; concurrent findings upheld; no merit in grievances; costs ordered only half in this Court because the first respondent had not pleaded the alternative case explicitly but raised it at the stage of evidence.
Law Points
- Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves under Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act
- 1872
- though not conclusive proof
- prior statement used to contradict a witness under Section 145 does not become substantive evidence and merely serves to throw doubt on veracity
- party's admission need not be put to the party
- full act name Indian Evidence Act
