Case Note & Summary
This appeal by special leave arose from a criminal revision where the Gujarat High Court set aside the Chief City Magistrate's dismissal of a complaint filed by the Inspector of Factories against the manager of Arun Mills Ltd. under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948. The manager was accused of permitting a dangerous part of machinery to remain unfenced, contrary to Section 21(1)(iv)(c) of the Act. A worker, Chandrakant Jethalal, suffered severe injury to his right hand on 27 February 1968 while cleaning a clip stentering machine with a rag; his hand slipped into the bevel gears, leading to amputation of fingers. The accident report was sent to the Inspector on 28 February 1968, but the Inspector visited the factory and conducted an inquiry only on 30 July 1968, and filed the complaint on 20 September 1968. The appellant raised a preliminary objection that prosecution was barred by time under Section 106 of the Factories Act, which requires a complaint to be made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector. The Magistrate accepted that objection, holding that the report itself conveyed knowledge of the commission of an offence, and dismissed the complaint. The High Court reversed this decision, finding that the report did not give knowledge of the offence, and the Inspector gained such knowledge only on the date of inquiry. Before the Supreme Court, the core question was whether the accident report contained sufficient facts to convey knowledge of commission of an offence under Section 21(1)(iv)(c). The Court examined the requirements of that provision: every dangerous part of machinery must be securely fenced by safeguards of substantial construction, kept in position while in motion or in use, unless it is in such position or of such construction as to be safe to every person employed. The report stated that while cleaning the clip stenter machine near the bevel gears, the rag and right palm slipped inside the gear and crushed the palm; it also mentioned that the machine was moved by mechanical power. However, it did not state that the dangerous part was not securely fenced, not safely positioned, or that safeguards were absent while in motion. The Court reasoned that anyone reading the report could not conclude that an offence under Section 21(1)(iv)(c) had been committed, as the essential elements of the offence were absent. It further held that knowledge of an accident is not knowledge of an offence. The Court interpreted Section 106 strictly, noting that the period of limitation begins from the date of actual knowledge of the commission of the offence, not from the date on which the Inspector ought to have acquired knowledge with diligence. Since the Factories Act does not prescribe any duty to inquire into the accident or a time limit for such inquiry, the Inspector's knowledge of the offence could only be treated as commencing on the inquiry date, 30 July 1968. The complaint filed on 20 September 1968 was accordingly within the three-month period. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's order, and ruled that the prosecution was not barred by limitation.
Headnote
A) Factories Act, 1948 - Offences Under Section 21(1)(iv)(c) - Dangerous Machinery Fencing Requirement - Section 21(1)(iv)(c) of Factories Act, 1948 - The accident report in Form 21 did not state that dangerous parts of machinery were not in such position or construction as to be safe as securely fenced, not securely fenced by substantial construction, or not kept in position while in motion or use; it only disclosed an accident to a worker cleaning a clip stentering machine where his hand was caught in bevel gears; Held that the report did not reveal the necessary elements constituting the offence under Section 21(1)(iv)(c), and mere knowledge of accident could not be equated with knowledge of commission of offence (Paras 2-4).
Issue of Consideration
Whether the facts mentioned in the accident report sent to the Inspector of Factories under Rule 103 Form 21 were sufficient to convey knowledge of commission of an offence under Section 21(1)(iv)(c) of Factories Act, 1948, so as to start limitation under Section 106 of the Act from the date of receipt of report.
Final Decision
Appeal dismissed; High Court order upheld; complaint not barred by limitation. Knowledge of accident is not knowledge of commission of offence; Inspector gained knowledge of offence only on inquiry date, 30-07-1968.
Law Points
- Knowledge of accident is not knowledge of commission of offence
- limitation under Section 106 Factories Act starts from date of actual knowledge of offence
- not from date of constructive knowledge
- report under Rule 103 Form 21 did not reveal essential ingredients of offence under Section 21(1)(iv)(c)
- no statutory duty on Inspector to inquire within a period
- equity and hardship not relevant in interpreting limitation provision
