Case Note & Summary
Background: This criminal appeal by special leave arose from a private complaint alleging forgery of a zerpeshgi deed and false personation in its registration under the Indian Registration Act, 1916. The complainant, Ramnagina Rai, filed the complaint before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against several accused, including the appellant Dharmadeo Rai, alleging conspiracy to forge a zerpeshgi deed dated 25-1-1964. Facts: The Sessions Court convicted two accused, Bishundeo Rai and Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, for offences under sections 467 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and sections 82(d) and 82(c) of the Indian Registration Act, respectively, but acquitted the appellant and two others by giving them the benefit of doubt. The complainant appealed against the appellant's acquittal in Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1966 before the Patna High Court, which set aside the acquittal and convicted the appellant under section 82(d) of the Indian Registration Act for abetment of an offence under section 82, sentencing him to six months rigorous imprisonment. The High Court overruled the appellant's contention that the complaint was not maintainable without permission under section 83 of the Act. Legal Issues: The sole question before the Supreme Court was whether the private complaint was incompetent because it had been filed without obtaining the necessary permission required by section 83(1) of the Indian Registration Act, 1916. Arguments: The appellant argued that section 83(1) required permission from the Inspector-General, Registrar, or Sub-Registrar before prosecution could be commenced, and since no such permission was obtained, the complaint was not maintainable and the conviction must be set aside. The respondent's arguments are not recorded in the available excerpt. Court's Analysis: The Supreme Court examined section 83(1), which provides that a prosecution for any offence under the Act coming to the knowledge of a registering officer in his official capacity may be commenced by or with the permission of specified officers. The court held that the section deals only with prosecutions for offences that come to the knowledge of the registering officer in his official capacity; it has no application where the offence does not come to such knowledge. The section is enabling and permissive, not prohibitory; it does not preclude a private person from commencing a prosecution, even in cases where the registering officer has official knowledge. The court compared section 83(1) with section 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, section 70(1) of the Indian Stamp Act, and section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, which use prohibitory language, and found that section 83(1) lacks such prohibitory terms. The court approved the views of the Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Patna, and Jammu & Kashmir High Courts that the provision is enabling, and disapproved the contrary views of the Allahabad and Rangoon High Courts that the word 'may' should be read as 'must' or that the section was prohibitory. The court also observed that if the section were construed as prohibitory, a private person seriously injured by forgery and false registration would be deprived of the liberty to prosecute, and a registering officer guilty of an offence under section 81 could escape prosecution. Decision: The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention and held that section 83(1) is permissive and not prohibitory, thereby upholding the maintainability of the private complaint. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the appellant's conviction and sentence under section 82(d) of the Indian Registration Act, 1916 were confirmed.
Headnote
A) Indian Registration Act, 1916 - Prosecution for Offences - Conditions Precedent to Prosecution - Section 83(1) - Permissive Not Prohibitory - The court interpreted Section 83(1) and held that it applies only to offences coming to the knowledge of a registering officer in his official capacity; in such cases, prosecution may be commenced by or with permission of specified officers, but this does not preclude a private person from prosecuting. (Pages 113-114). B) Statutory Interpretation - Permissive vs Mandatory Language - Word 'May' Does Not Mean 'Must' - Section 83(1) Indian Registration Act, 1916 and analogous provisions - The court compared Section 83(1) with Section 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, Section 70(1) of the Indian Stamp Act, and Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, which use prohibitory language, and held Section 83(1) is not prohibitory either in terms or intention; disapproved Allahabad and Rangoon High Court views that read 'may' as 'must' and approved Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Patna and Jammu & Kashmir High Court views. (Pages 114-116).
Issue of Consideration
Whether a private complaint under the Indian Registration Act, 1916 was maintainable without the permission required by section 83(1) of the Act; and whether section 83(1) is prohibitory or permissive.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention, holding that section 83(1) of the Indian Registration Act, 1916 is permissive and not prohibitory, and does not preclude a private person from commencing a prosecution; consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the appellant's conviction and sentence under section 82(d) were upheld.
Law Points
- Section 83(1) of Indian Registration Act
- 1916 is permissive and not prohibitory
- does not preclude private person from commencing prosecution
- applies only when offence comes to knowledge of registering officer in official capacity
- word 'may' is enabling not mandatory
