Case Note & Summary
By special leave, the Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation, appealed to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Kerala High Court dated June 26, 1968, which confirmed the acquittal of the respondents in a prosecution under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The first respondent was the manager and the second respondent, his wife, was the owner and licensee of a tea stall at premises No. 4/777 Customs Road, Calicut. On November 17, 1965, at about 9:45 A.M., the Food Inspector purchased from the first respondent 600 grams of sugar for a price of 78 paise for analysis from the stock kept in the premises for preparation of tea sold to customers. The sample was drawn in accordance with the rules, and one portion was sent to the Public Analyst, whose report dated December 28, 1965 certified that the sample contained artificial sweetener saccharin equivalent to about seven percent of cane sugar and was therefore adulterated. On March 21, 1966, the Food Inspector filed a complaint before the District Magistrate (Judicial), Calicut, alleging that sale of such sub-standard food was prohibited under Section 7 read with item A.07.01 in the Appendix to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. The accused pleaded not guilty and denied having sold sugar. The District Magistrate found that sugar was an article of food under Section 2(v), that the Food Inspector purchased and sampled the sugar in compliance with the Act, and that the Public Analyst's report established adulteration. However, the Magistrate held that to convict the accused it was necessary to establish that they were selling sugar as such in the tea stall, which was not the case; they were selling tea and sugar was kept only for mixing with tea. Accordingly, the accused were acquitted under Section 258(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The State appealed to the Kerala High Court, which agreed with the findings of sale and adulteration but applied the test whether the respondents were 'persons selling sugar as such'. Answering in the negative, the High Court held that the purchase by the Food Inspector could not be considered a purchase under the Act, and confirmed the acquittal. Before the Supreme Court, counsel for the appellant contended that once an article of food is sold to a Food Inspector for analysis, it is of no consequence that the article was not intended to be sold as such; sale under the Act attracts all consequences. Counsel for the respondents argued that to make them liable it must be established that they were dealers in sugar as such, and the concurrent findings justified acquittal. The appellant's counsel clarified that the Corporation did not seek conviction of the respondents but only a decision on the legal point. The Supreme Court examined the definitions and provisions of the Act. Section 2(xiii) defines 'sale' to include sale of any article of food for analysis. Section 7 prohibits selling of adulterated food, and Section 16(1)(a)(i) penalizes any person who sells any adulterated article of food. The transaction of selling sugar to the Food Inspector for analysis clearly amounted to a sale under Section 2(xiii). The Court observed that neither Section 7 nor Section 16(1)(a)(i) required that the seller be a dealer in the article or that the article be intended for sale as such. The article of food purchased by the Food Inspector need not be taken from a larger quantity intended for sale, and the person from whom it was purchased need not be a dealer in that article. The earlier decisions in Kandasamy Reddiar and Govinda Rao were explained and disapproved respectively. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and held the respondents guilty of the offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Act, as the sugar sold to the Food Inspector was adulterated.
Headnote
A) Food Adulteration - Sale for Analysis - Definition of 'Sale' - Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, Section 2(xiii) - The transaction of selling 600 grams of sugar to the Food Inspector for analysis constituted a 'sale' within the meaning of Section 2(xiii), which expressly includes sale for analysis. The accused's contention that sugar kept for preparing tea and not for sale as such did not negate the existence of a sale. Held that sale for analysis is sufficient to attract the provisions of the Act. B) Food Adulteration - Offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) - No Requirement of Dealer Status or Intended Sale - Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, Sections 7 and 16(1)(a)(i) - The accused sold adulterated sugar to the Food Inspector; once a sale of adulterated food is established, there is no further requirement that the seller be a dealer in that article or that the article be kept for sale as such. The District Magistrate and High Court erred in acquitting the respondents on the ground that they were not selling sugar as such. Held that the respondents were guilty of the offence charged.
Issue of Consideration
Whether a sale of an article of food to a Food Inspector for analysis, where the article is not intended for sale as such and the seller is not a dealer in that article, constitutes an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and held the respondents guilty of the offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, as the sugar sold to the Food Inspector was adulterated.
Law Points
- Sale of food for analysis constitutes 'sale' under Section 2(xiii) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
- 1954
- seller need not be dealer
- article need not be intended for sale
- adulterated food sold to Food Inspector attracts Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7.


