Supreme Court Upholds State in Land Acquisition Appeal Concerning Cross-Examination Right Under Section 5A Inquiry. No Right to Cross-Examine Acquiring Body Officers Absent Evidence; Industrial Estate by Statutory Corporation Held Public Purpose Under Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Case Note & Summary

The appeal arose from a judgment of the Gujarat High Court dismissing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The appellant was the owner of Survey Nos. 219/1 and 121 situated on the outskirts of Mahuva in Bhavnagar District. By notification dated April 25, 1969, issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the State Government declared that these lands were needed for the public purpose of construction of an Industrial Estate by the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation. On May 3, 1969, the Officer on Special Duty issued a notice to the appellant, informing him that he could file objections on or before August 16, 1969, and that he or his counsel would be heard at the time of filing objections. The appellant filed written objections. He alleged that the Corporation had come out with ambitious projects and that the land already acquired by the Corporation was in excess of its requirement. He claimed that the Corporation did not possess material to establish the genuineness of establishing an industrial estate at Mahuva, and he prayed that the responsible officers of the Corporation be summoned for cross-examination to show that the proposed acquisition was not for a public purpose and that there was no need to acquire his land. He further contended that other suitable contiguous lands were available and that the Corporation had not availed of them, and that the acquisition was mala fide because his lands were preferred to other available lands. He requested personal hearing and cross-examination of the Corporation officers. The hearing was initially fixed for September 18, 1969, and was extended from time to time until November 18, 1969. The appellant did not appear on any of these dates and did not apply for any further extension of time. His written objections dated August 12/18, 1969 and September 18, 1969 were considered and included in the report submitted to the Government under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act. The appellant then filed Special Civil Application No. 464 of 1970 before the Gujarat High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the acquisition. The High Court dismissed the petition on July 31, 1970, holding that the inquiry under Section 5A(2) was an administrative inquiry and that the objector was not entitled to cross-examine any officers or members of the acquiring body. The High Court also held that the establishment of an Industrial Area by the Corporation was a public purpose. Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court by certificate granted by the High Court under Articles 132 and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant primarily pressed the ground that the report under Section 5A was vitiated because the Collector had not granted him an opportunity to cross-examine the officers of the Corporation for the purpose of showing that the acquisition did not serve a public purpose and that there was no need to acquire his land. The respondents argued that the rules framed under Section 55 of the Land Acquisition Act had been complied with, that the appellant had been given an opportunity to be heard personally but had not availed himself of that opportunity, and that the rules did not confer a right to cross-examine Corporation officers who had not given any evidence. The Supreme Court examined the rules framed under Section 55 of the Act for the guidance of officers dealing with objections under Section 5A. Those rules provided that after admitting an objection and after giving the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader, the Collector shall decide whether it is desirable to hear oral or documentary evidence, which under Section 14 or Section 40 of the Act he has power to call for. If evidence tendered by the objector is admitted, the Collector shall afford the other party an opportunity of rebutting it by other evidence or of cross-examining the witnesses. The Court found that these rules had been complied with in the present case. The appellant was given an opportunity to be heard personally but chose not to avail himself of that opportunity. The Court held that the appellant could not, under these rules, claim to cross-examine officers of the Corporation when they had not given any evidence before the Collector, and there was no principle which entitled him to claim such a right. The Court observed that the question whether the inquiry was administrative or quasi-judicial did not arise because rules had been framed under Section 55 and complied with. Accordingly, it was not necessary to consider whether the inquiry was administrative or quasi-judicial or whether rules of natural justice had been complied with. On the question of legislative competence, the Court noted that the point no longer survived because this Court had upheld the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation Act, 1962 as valid in Ramtanu C.H. Society v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1771. On the issue of public purpose, the Court agreed with the High Court that the establishment of an Industrial Area by the Corporation was a public purpose. In the result, the appeal failed and was dismissed with costs.

Headnote

Issue of Consideration

Final Decision

Appeal dismissed with costs. The Supreme Court held that when rules framed under Section 55 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 regulating Section 5A inquiry had been complied with, the objector had no right to cross-examine officers of the acquiring Corporation when they had not given evidence; the establishment of Industrial Area by the Corporation was a public purpose.

Law Points