Case Note & Summary
The matter arose from a service dispute where the appellant, who had been appointed temporarily as Director of Public Instruction, Bihar, challenged an order posting him as Director of State Institute of Education. The appellant was appointed by order dated March 21, 1968, on a temporary basis for a period not exceeding six months pending concurrence of the Public Service Commission. Subsequently, by order dated November 18, 1968, the State Government posted him as Director of State Institute of Education, noting that he had been officiating as Director of Public Instruction. Aggrieved, the appellant filed C.W.J.C. No. 153 of 1969 before the Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, alleging mala fides and contending that the order was contrary to the decision of the Council of Ministers. The High Court dismissed the writ petition summarily on February 17, 1969, without issuing notice to the respondents, holding that since the appellant's appointment was purely temporary and the Public Service Commission did not concur, he had no right to claim the post, and there was no prima facie case of mala fides. The appellant then applied for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(a) to (c) of the Constitution. In that application, the High Court held that Article 133(1)(a) was not applicable because the subject matter was the right to continue in office, not salary; it doubted whether Article 133(1)(b) could apply but ultimately granted a certificate on March 13, 1969, stating that the valuation requirement was fulfilled under Article 133(1) of the Constitution, without specifying the precise clause. The appellant filed Civil Appeal No. 1256 of 1969 in the Supreme Court, and the respondent State filed C.M.P. No. 4498 of 1969 seeking revocation of the certificate. The Supreme Court, before considering the merits, addressed the preliminary objection regarding the validity of the certificate. Dr. L.M. Singhvi for the State argued that the certificate was invalid because the High Court had not granted it under Article 133(1)(c), had expressly rejected clause (a), and the purported grant under clause (b) was based on an incorrect method of valuing future emoluments. Mr. S.T. Desai for the appellant contended that the certificate under clause (b) was correct and, alternatively, that the High Court should be asked to consider Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(c); he also argued that the High Court should not have dismissed the writ petition in limine. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had not properly considered the application for grant of certificate under Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(b) and (c). It noted that the High Court, while discussing clause (b), entertained doubts and ultimately based valuation on the assumption that the appellant would have earned emoluments for three years and three months, which was not a proper determination. The Court therefore concluded that the certificate was not validly granted and remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration, directing that the fresh order must clearly indicate under which particular article or clause the certificate was granted. The Court did not go into the merits of the writ petition or decide whether the dismissal in limine was erroneous, though it referred to precedents on the principles governing dismissal of writ petitions at the threshold. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the certificate application to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.
Headnote
A) Constitution - Appeals to Supreme Court - Certificate of fitness under Articles 132(1) and 133(1) - High Court must consider every clause relied upon and specify the exact provision granting certificate - Constitution of India, Articles 132(1), 133(1)(a)-(c) - The High Court, while considering an application for certificate, held clause (a) inapplicable but granted certificate under Article 133(1) without specifying precise clause, relying on valuation based on future emoluments. The Supreme Court held that such certificate was not validly granted and remanded the matter for fresh consideration with a direction to clearly indicate under which article or clause the certificate is granted (Paras Not mentioned). B) Constitution - Writ Jurisdiction - Dismissal in limine under Article 226 - A High Court should not dismiss a writ petition summarily if a prima facie case for investigation is made out - Constitution of India, Article 226 - Though the Supreme Court did not decide the merits, it referred to principles from Century Spinning and Exen Industries that a petition alleging unlawful, arbitrary or unjust order by a public body should not be thrown out in limine unless frivolous or vexatious; the High Court had summarily rejected the writ petition without issuing notice, which the appellant challenged (Paras Not mentioned).
Issue of Consideration
Whether the certificate granted by the High Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution was valid; whether the High Court properly considered Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(b) and (c); whether the writ petition was rightly dismissed in limine
Final Decision
The Supreme Court did not decide the appeal on merits. It held that the certificate granted by the High Court was not valid because the High Court had not properly considered Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(b) and (c) and had not specified the exact provision. The Court remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of the certificate application and directed that the fresh order must clearly indicate under which article or clause the certificate is granted.
Law Points
- High Court must clearly indicate under which article or clause certificate is granted
- Article 133(1)(a) not applicable when subject matter is right to continue in office not salary
- valuation under Article 133(1)(b) cannot be based on speculative future emoluments
- certificate invalid if High Court fails to consider Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(b) and (c)
