Case Note & Summary
Background: The Supreme Court considered an appeal against a judgment of the Designated Court, Delhi, convicting the appellant under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs 1000, with default imprisonment for another two months. Facts: The appellant's counsel submitted that the conviction could not be sustained in view of the decision of this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab. In that case, R.M. Sahai J construed Section 5 of TADA and expressed the view that the provisions of the section could be invoked only when the prosecution was able to establish that there was some material on record to show that the arms and ammunition mentioned in the section were likely to be used for any terrorist or disruptive activity or that they had been used as such. The Court noted that the other four Judges who constituted the Bench which decided the said case had not expressed any opinion on the construction of Section 5 of TADA. Legal Issues: The core questions were whether the aforesaid view of Sahai J on interpretation of Section 5 of TADA was to be regarded as the judgment of the Constitution Bench, and if not, what was the true ambit and scope of Section 5 TADA. Arguments: The appellant contended that the conviction was unsustainable because the prosecution had not established material showing likely use of arms and ammunition for terrorist or disruptive activity or actual such use, as required by Sahai J's construction. No argument for the respondent was recorded, but the Court recognized the importance of the question arising in a large number of cases. Court's Analysis: The two-Judge Bench reasoned that the absence of a majority view on Section 5 TADA created uncertainty about the correct legal position. It observed that only R.M. Sahai J had expressed an opinion on Section 5, while the other four judges remained silent. Therefore, the question whether a single judge's view could be treated as the judgment of the Constitution Bench and the true ambit and scope of Section 5 required authoritative determination by a larger Bench. Decision: The Court directed that the matter be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for suitable directions and granted liberty to the parties to mention for a date of hearing of the appeal. The appeal was not decided on merits and no final relief was granted.
Headnote
A) Criminal Law - Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 - Interpretation of Section 5 - Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, Section 5 - The appeal arose from conviction under Section 5 of TADA. The appellant relied on Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, in which R.M. Sahai J construed Section 5 as requiring material that arms and ammunition were likely to be used for terrorist or disruptive activity or had been used as such; the other four judges expressed no opinion. The two-Judge Bench referred to a three-Judge Bench the questions whether Sahai J's view constituted the judgment of the Constitution Bench and, if not, the true ambit and scope of Section 5. Held that the matter should be placed before the Chief Justice for directions and parties given liberty to mention for hearing date (Paras 1-3).
Issue of Consideration
Whether the view expressed by R.M. Sahai J on interpretation of Section 5 of TADA in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab constitutes the judgment of the Constitution Bench, and if not, what is the true ambit and scope of Section 5 of TADA.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court did not decide the appeal on merits. It referred the questions regarding interpretation of Section 5 TADA to a three-Judge Bench and directed that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice of India for suitable directions, with liberty to the parties to mention for a date of hearing.
Law Points
- Section 5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
- 1987 can be invoked only when prosecution establishes material showing arms and ammunition were likely to be used for terrorist or disruptive activity or had been used as such
- absence of majority view on Section 5 TADA necessitated reference to larger Bench
- question whether single judge's view constitutes Constitution Bench judgment referred to three-Judge Bench.
